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Success, Dominance, and Interoperability
ALAN DEVLIN,* MICHAEL JACOBS** & BRUNO PEIXOTO***
In September 2007, the European Court of First Instance (CFI) ruled that
Microsoft violated the European Union's competition law byfailing to provide certain
of its rivals with proprietary computer protocols that would have enabled them to
make their products fully "interoperable" with Microsoft's dominant operating
system. In the process, the court suggested that an owner of certain kinds of dominant
intellectual property is obliged to share its property with rivals to the extent necessary
to allow those rivals to compete "viably" with the dominant firm. Thus, in theory,
should protocol sharing fail to achieve the requisite degree of "viability, " the court
could in the future order Microsoft to share its proprietary source code, if in its view
that kind of compulsory disclosure is the only way in which the rival could achieve
competitive "viability. "
Among other things, this ruling has placed in stark relief a critical tension, not only
as to the proper application and adjustment of competition law and intellectual
property law, but also between the respective legal approaches to these issues of the
United States and the European Union competition regulators. While Europe has
optedfor less intellectual property protection and more short-term consumer benefit,
the United States-which almostfully protects dominant intellectual property holders
from sharing obligations-has chosen to sacrifice some short-term consumer welfare
in exchangeforpreserving to afuller extent the incentives for innovation and the long-
term consumer benefits that it promises to bring.
This Article explores these tensions and attempts in the process to assess the
relative merits of the European and U.S. approaches. Since it is impossible to evaluate
the conflicting approaches empirically, we endeavor to compare them along several
theoretical and practical dimensions, and then to suggest a set of narrow
circumstances when sharing obligations might achieve net social benefits. We
conclude that, taken together, the benefits of unimpeded invention and the costs of
error inevitably associated with mistaken judicial efforts to impose sharing
requirements on firms possessed of dominant intellectual property counsel strongly
against the aggressive imposition of such requirements, and in favor of approaches
that are least likely to dilute ex ante incentives to invent.
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INTRODUCTION
When, if ever, is it desirable to deny a dominant company the exclusive use of its
intellectual property?
Despite its ostensible simplicity, this question poses one of the most exigent
contemporary problems in the fields of intellectual property and antitrust.' The
complexity of the dilemma emanates from the systemic tension underlying it: unlike
traditional markets, in which static competition leads to efficiency, network industries
in "new economy" or "information" markets display a trade-off between short-term
consumer harm and longer-term innovation. 2 The high-technology markets of the new
economy are a paradigm for the Schumpeterian view of antitrust, in which waves of
1. See, e.g., Thomas 0. Barnett, Interoperability Between Antitrust and Intellectual
Property, 14 GEO. MASON L. REv. 859 (2007); Eleanor M. Fox, A Tale of Two Jurisdictions and
an Orphan Case: Antitrust, Intellectual Property, and Refusais to Deal, 28 FoRDHAM INT'LL.J.
952 (2005); Simon Genevaz, Against Immunity for Unilateral Refusals to Deal in Intellectual
Property: Why Antitrust Law Should Not Distinguish Between IP and Other Property Rights, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 741 (2004); Marina Lao, Unilateral Refusals to Sell or License
Intellectual Property and the Antitrust Duty to Deal, 9 CORINELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 193 (1999);
Kathryn McMahon, Interoperability: "Indispensability " and "Special Responsibility" in High
Technology Markets, 9 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 123 (2007); Maureen A. O'Rourke,
Striking a Delicate Balance: Intellectual Property, Antitrust, Contract, and Standardization in
the Computer Industry, 12 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 1 (1998); Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust and
Intellectual Property: Unresolved Issues at the Heart of the New Economy, 16 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 535 (2001); Robert Pitofsky, Challenges of the New Economy: Issues at the Intersection of
Antitrust and Intellectual Property, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 913, 921-22 (2001).
2. See, e.g., Giovanni Dosi, Luigi Marengo & Corrado Pasquali, Knowledge, Competition
and Innovation: Is Strong IPR Protection Really Neededfor More and Better Innovations?, 13
MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REv. 471,473-74 (2007).
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"creative destruction" lead to long-run efficiency.3 Though legal protection of"strong"
intellectual property rights appears essential for the efficacy of this view,4 serious
questions remain over the degree of protection required to fuel desirable rates of
innovation. 5 Lacking precise knowledge of this threshold, antitrust enforcers may be
understandably tempted to moderate immediate and unequivocal consumer harm
through mandatory licensing or interoperability. 6 Unfortunately, such moves may be
myopic.
7
This Article seeks to delineate the optimal rule governing compulsory licensing and
interoperability. Accomplishing this task involves tackling a number of related and
challenging questions. Should an otherwise obeisant attitude toward legally acquired
property shift in the face of serious short-term harm to consumer welfare, or is that
ephemeral disutility the necessary driving force for long-term consumer benefit?
8
Compounding the difficulty are profound questions concerning the proper nature and
scope of intellectual property protection: Should a parsimonious or maximalist view
prevail? 9 Should properly obtained intellectual property rights be violable, and
therefore more highly stochastic, or sacrosanct, and hence more secure? 0
The proper resolution of these questions is ofthe utmost importance for a number of
reasons. First, excessive dilution of intellectual property may eviscerate incentives for
current and future innovation, with disastrous long-term economic consequences."
Conversely, excessive protection of intellectual property may result in needless
consumer harm and improper wealth transfers.' 2 The hitch is that society must rely on
3. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 91 (3d ed.
1950). But see Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Invention, in ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 144, 156-60 (Julius Margolis ed., 1971)
(arguing that greater incentives to invent exist under competitive conditions than in a
monopoly); Marina Lao, supra note 1, at 215-18 (citing sources suggesting that the superior
impetus for innovation may come from competition). See generally Richard J. Gilbert & Steven
C. Sunshine, Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency Concerns in Merger Analysis: The Use of
Innovation Markets, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 569, 574-76 (1995).
4. Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Policy, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 534, 577-78 (2003).
5. See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property,
71 U. CHI. L. REv. 129 (2004); Weiser, supra note 4, at 579-82.
6. See, e.g., Harry First, Microsoft and the Evolution of the Intellectual Property Concept,
2006 Wis. L. REv. 1369, 1431-32 (summarizing instances in which such balancing has taken
place); Lemley, supra note 5.
7. See Barnett, supra note 1, at 860-62.
8. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
9. See generally Robert Patrick Merges & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Proper Scope of
the Copyright and Patent Power, 37 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 45 (2000).
10. See generally Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON.
PERSP. 75 (2005).
11. See, e.g., Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n, AIPLA Testimony Before Federal Trade
Commission and Antitrust Division on Antitrust and Intellectual Property Issues 6-7 (Apr. 10,
2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/intelpropertycomments/aipla.pdf.
12. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Towards a Pro-Development and Balanced Intellectual
Property Regime, Keynote Address at the World Intellectual Property Organization Ministerial
Conference on Intellectual Property for Least Developed Countries (Oct. 25, 2004), available at
2009] 1159
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
theory in making its determination, as definitive empirical answers must await the real-
life outcome of a wide-scale diminution of dominant firms' intellectual property rights.
The cost of that lesson could be prohibitive.
Second, externalities in the formulation of appropriate solutions exist on both sides
of the Atlantic. 13 This is because the legal obligations imposed by one jurisdiction
transcend its own economy to affect others.1 4 Inconsistencies raise the cost of
compliance for afflicted companies and may cause them to adopt the rule of the most
restrictive jurisdiction.
All of these questions are immensely topical. The European Court of First
Instance's (CFI's) recent decision in Microsoft Corp. v. Commission of the European
Communities involved the resolution of precisely such issues.15 Antitrust policy in
network industries seems to have taken on highly distinctive forms on both sides of the
Atlantic, as U.S. enforcers provide near-absolute protection for intellectual property
fights, and European Commission (EC) authorities view them as considerably less
inviolable. 16 The asymmetry in treatment comes with a host of concomitant problems,
not the least of which is the fact that the high-technology markets that populate the
"new economy" are of ever-increasing importance to the global economy.' 7 If two
distinct, and often conflicting, views on competition policy in information markets
emerge, the number of damaging incidences of divergence will increase.' 8 Meanwhile,
the societal cost of economically unsound antitrust policy will elevate in tandem.
Ominously, the proverbial knives were sharpened in Europe as Apple's massive
success led to a dominant position protected by intellectual property rights. 19 There is
http://www2.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/jstiglitz/download/2004_TOWARDSAPRODEVEL
OPMENT.htm.
13. For a discussion of the effects of externalities in formulating antitrust rules in the new
economy, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 323-26 (6th ed. 2003).
14. See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004) (noting
that extraterritorial antitrust enforcement "creates a serious risk of interference with a foreign
nation's ability independently to regulate its own commercial affairs").
15. See Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n, 2004 E.C.R. 11-4463.
16. See, e.g., Sara M. Biggers, Richard A. Mann & Barry S. Roberts, Intellectual Property
and Antitrust: A Comparison of Evolution in the European Union and United States, 22
HASTINGS IN 'L & COMP. L. REv. 209 (1999). Compare U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE
COMM'N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 32 (2007) (concluding that antitrust liability for a refusal to
license patents "will not play a meaningful part in the interface between patent rights and
antitrust protections") with Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n, 2004 E.C.R. 11-4463
(requiring Microsoft to make sufficient proprietary information available to rivals to facilitate
interoperability).
17. See ECON. & STATISTICS ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, DIGITAL ECONOMY 2000, at
59-67 (2000), available at http://www.esa.doc.gov/Reports/DIGITAL.pdf (discussing the
increasing importance of information goods in the new economy).
18. For a discussion on the benefits of antitrust harmonization, see generally Diane P.
Wood, International Harmonization ofAntitrust Law: The Tortoise or the Hare?, 3 CHI. J. INT'L
L. 391 (2002).
19. See, e.g., Deana Sobel, Note, A Bite out of Apple? iTunes, Interoperability, and
France's Dadvsi Law, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 267 (2007).
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every threat that Apple, and others similarly situated, will be subjected to different sets
of obligations in Europe and America.20
This Article seeks to accomplish a number of goals. First, it seeks to define the ideal
antitrust rules that should be applied to cases where dominant positions are protected,
and defined, by intellectual property. We acknowledge that any hard rule will be
accompanied by Type 121 and 1122 errors, but emphasize that formulating an efficient
antitrust rule is equivalent to identifying the welfare-maximizing heuristic
2 3
The Article counsels an agnostic analytic approach, in which one should oppose any
dilution in ex ante incentives. As a result, intellectual property rights should be
regarded as sacrosanct and inviolable.
To expose this approach to the highest possible scrutiny, we consider the mostt
compelling cases in favor of compulsory licensing. The strongest economic argument
for interoperability exists where economic incentives to produce the relevant goods
exist independent of property protection. We highlight four such possible scenarios.
First, we consider the situation in which the beneficiaries of mandatory licensing do not
stand in horizontal competition with the dominant firm. In such circumstances, the
utilitarian case for mandatory dissemination may be ostensibly compelling. Second,
and related, requiring a dominant company to license or otherwise share "weak"
intellectual property rights with horizontal competitors could conceivably be Kaldor-
Hicks efficient where the short-run consumer savings are significant.24 Third, a dilution
of otherwise inviolable intellectual property rights could conceivably be desirable in
cases involving a "tragedy of the anticommons.' 25 Finally, where price theoretic
models demonstrate some credible reason to believe that the Schumpeterian process of
competition would be impeded were no interoperability facilitated, compulsory access
may appear proper.
Yet, this Article shows that only the last of these scenarios presents facts worthy of
mandatory interoperability. Compulsory licensing should be used only to remedy a
distinct antitrust violation. Instances in which patentees or copyright holders refuse to
share their valuable information should be viewed as harmonious with, and
nonviolative of, competition law. We reach this conclusion on a number of grounds. In
20. See Barnett, supra note 1, at 861-66.
21. A Type I error arises when a proper null hypothesis is erroneously rejected. See, e.g.,
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1477,
1504 (1999) (defining type I and type II errors). As applied to the current context, Type I errors
occur when socially desirable business practices are struck down.
22. A Type II error occurs when an improper null hypothesis is mistakenly accepted. See id.
23. Cf Jonathan Haidt, Susanne Baer, Leda Cosmides, Richard A. Epstein, Wolfgang
Fikentscher, Eric J. Johnson, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Clara Sattler de Sousa e Brito & Indra
Spiecker Genannt D6hmann, Group Report: What Is the Role of Heuristics in Making Law? in
HEuRisCs AND THE LAW 239,242 (Gerd Gigerenzer& Christoph Engel eds., 2006) (describing
legal heuristics as "simplified procedure[s] that ha[ve] been encoded into law or the lawmaking
process").
24. An exchange is Kaldor-Hicks efficient when it enhances net social welfare but leaves at
least one party worse off than he was ex ante. See POSNER, supra note 13, at 13.
25. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from
Marx to Markets, 111 HARv. L. REv. 621, 624 (1998) (defining anticommons and crediting
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244-45 (1968), with
introducing the "tragedy of the commons").
2009] 1161
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particular, it will rarely be true that depriving an intellectual property holder of its right
to exclude will not affect ex ante investment incentives. Moreover, even if such
scenarios potentially existed, recognizing an exception would allow subsequent actors
to misconstrue precedent and improperly diminish intellectual property. We consider
this to be a grave danger given the lack ofjudicial sophistication in economics and the
tendency for regulators to apply antitrust rules to achieve socio-political ends.
26
Assuming arguendo that antitrust policy would properly impose interoperability
requirements on dramatically successful companies, competition enforcers nevertheless
lack the ability effectively and reliably to implement such a policy.27 In effect, society
could conceivably have the means of identifying an imperfection, yet lack the tools by
which to remedy it. The problem is essentially regulatory in nature and primarily
involves the issue of access pricing. Where a dominant company is ordered to license
its valuable intellectual property, what price should it be allowed to charge? No doubt
a court or regulator would allow a "reasonable price," but what would that mean?
28
Should a monopoly return be allowed? If so, we encounter problems of definition, as
the economic conditions leading to price setting would be distinguishable in this
context from normal profit-maximizing scenarios. If a competitive price should be
required, that would entail the access charge being set equal to zero, which would of
course be perverse. Establishing a price somewhere else along the spectrum would
require a regulator. Were industry static, this might be achievable, but given the
dizzying pace of innovation in modem information markets, the task would likely be
Sisyphean.
Second, and consistent with the preceding analysis, the Article argues that the
European Microsoft decision involves a radical extension of preexisting EC law and
creates a Damoclean threat to ex ante innovation. Although EC competition law had
previously required holders of intellectual property to disseminate the associated rights
in certain cases29 a requirement that no U.S. court has ever imposed3° -the rights at
issue were generally "weak." 31 In other words, mandatory dissemination of the relevant
licenses would usually have had a limited, though we argue also objectionable, effect
26. Indeed, the CFI's decision against Microsoft provides the perfect example, as the Court
broadly construed precedent that could have been read narrowly. See Case T-201/04, Microsoft
Corp. v. Comm'n, 2004 E.C.R. 11-4463; infra Part I.B.
27. See Makan Delrahim, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice Antitrust
Div., Forcing Firms to Share the Sandbox: Compulsory Licensing of Intellectual Property
Rights and Antitrust, Remarks at the British Institute of International and Comparative Law 13-
16 (May 10, 2004) (describing the difficulty of administering remedial compulsory licensing),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/203627.pdf.
28. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000) (providing that a patentee is entitled to no less than a
"reasonable royalty" as damages for infringement and noting that a "court may receive expert
testimony as an aid to the determination... of what royalty would be reasonable under the
circumstances").
29. See Case 238/87, AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd., 1988 E.C.R. 6211.
30. See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(affirming that "[t]he owner of the [intellectual property right], if it pleases, may refrain from
vending or licensing and content [itself] with simply exercising the right to exclude others from
using [its] property" (quoting Data Gen. Corp. v. Gmmman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147,
1186 (1st Cir. 1994) (third and fourth alterations in original))).
31. See infra Part H.
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on ex ante incentives. In stark contrast, Microsoft involved property rights ofdefinitive
importance to the market-a fact made clear by the company's competitors. 32 No
economic theory of consumer harm or justification for compulsory licensing was
identified by the CFI. We conclude that the decision was ill-considered. Once more,
success was attacked in the name of consumers, though consumers were themselves
benefiting from a product that existed only because of that success.33
Third, the Article concludes by calling for greater transatlantic dialogue about the
role of intellectual property and consumer welfare in modem network industries. We
believe that sound economic insights strongly support the jealous protection of
intellectual property rights. To the extent antitrust enforcers nevertheless believe that
interoperable remedies may sometimes be justified, we stress the importance of a price-
theoretic foundation for consumer harm.34 An absblute minimum in any such case must
be the clear demarcation of a plausible economic theory that suggests that harm to
innovation will be outweighed by the short-term boon to consumers. Such a theory was
conspicuously absent from the CFI's Microsoft decision. Requiring the exposition of
an underlying economic theory would do much good even if its only effect were to
focus the judges' minds on the fact that harm to competitors is, in itself, irrelevant.35
There is every reason to think that this benefit would be one amongst many.
Part I explores relevant case law in the United States and Europe, highlighting the
maximalist perspective prevalent in the former and contrasting the divergent and
economically questionable path of European antitrust jurisprudence. We assess the
leading cases is assessed for their impact on ex ante incentives and ex post static
efficiency. Such analysis provides an intuitive path to the more formal economic
analysis presented in Part II. Part III presents the normative case for treating
intellectual property rights as inviolable. Given problems of information asymmetry,
regulatory capture, and consumer myopia, in addition to the relative superiority of
heuristic rules favoring undiluted exclusivity, we argue that questions of compatibility
should be the exclusive prerogative of the patent or copyright holder. We show that
even the strongest cases for compulsory interoperability provide insufficient basis for
diluting these valuable intellectual property rights.
Part IV shows that, irrespective of the normative case for interoperability, pragmatic
concerns foreclose the efficient implementation of that specific remedy. In particular,
the access-price constraint is apt to form a highly problematic and costly barrier to
judicial intervention. Part V presents a melancholy outlook on the likely path of
competition policy in information markets. Myopic regulatory action in the new
32. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. PAGE & JOHN E. LOPATKA, THE MICROSOFT CASE: ANTITRUST,
HIGH TECHNOLOGY, AND CONSUMER WELFARE 28 (2007) (noting that antitrust investigators were
flooded with "incessant complaints and submissions from Microsoft's rivals") (citing William
H. Page, Microsoft and the Public Choice Critique ofAntitrust, 44 ANTITRUST BULL. 5 (1999)).
33. Indeed, this violates a fundamental tenet of antitrust policy, most famously articulated
by Judge Learned Hand. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir.
1945) ("The successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon
when he wins.").
34. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 107-15 (1978) (explaining how
economics should be applied to benefit consumer welfare).
35. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Chicago School and Exclusionary Conduct, 31 HARv.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 439, 442-43 (2008).
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economy setting presents the twenty-first century's "Antitrust Paradox." More
specifically, the well-meaning, though obtuse, pursuit of conventional antitrust ideals
threatens to unravel the very fabric that binds new economy markets together. As a
result, consumer welfare may no longer be the sole metric by which to judge prudent
and informed antitrust policy. This is a concern to which competition authorities must
now display heightened sensitivity. A brief conclusion follows.
I. THE NEBULOUS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ANTITRUST AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
This Part considers how U.S. and EC competition law deal with the problem of
near-monopoly positions founded on, and protected by, intellectual property rights. A
clear divergence has emerged, with the United States having taken the more
economically sophisticated path. We argue that Europe is on a dangerous road that
ought to be reconsidered for the good of its own consumers, for the economic validity
and coherence of its antitrust regime, and for the benefit of international
harmonization. Although Europe ostensibly adheres to the principle that a duty to
supply should be required only in the absence of "objective justification, '36 in practice
this qualification has taken on a different meaning than intuition would suggest and
sound economic policy would dictate.
A. The Strong Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in the United States
U.S. law gives broad, though not unqualified, deference to a patent or copyright
holder's refusal to share its intellectual property. Despite some apparent inconsistency
in the law, it is clear that an intellectual property holder can generally refuse to license
its patent- or copyright-protected technology without violating the Sherman Act.37 Yet,
it is also true that "[i]ntellectual property rights do not confer a privilege to violate the
antitrust laws."3
Although the leading U.S. cases that have considered a refusal to supply intellectual
property reached ostensibly divergent outcomes,39 the differences are small and
reconcilable. Construed harmoniously, the cases hold that a company has an
unqualified right to refuse to supply its intellectual property alone.40 However, if it
refuses to supply both intellectual property and unprotected information, regular
monopolization standards apply and a violation of the Sherman Act could follow.
4 1
Given the narrow and readily definable circumstances in which a duty to disclose could
arise, the dilution of intellectual property in the United States has been highly limited.
36. See, e.g., Commission Decision 500/87, Brass Band Instruments Ltd. v. Boosey &
Hawkes PLC, 1987 O.J. (L 286) 36 (EC).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (2006); see also Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
125 F.3d 1195, 1215 (9th Cir. 1997).
38. In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing
Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
39. Compare Kodak, 125 F.3d at 1195 with In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203
F.3d at 1322.
40. See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d at 1322.
41. See id.
[Vol. 84:11571164
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Because patent and copyright holders enjoy an unqualified right to deprive others of
access to their protected information, ex ante investment incentives are not mistakenly
diminished by the antitrust laws.42In the United States, it remains true that there is "no
reported case in which a court has imposed antitrust liability for a unilateral refusal to
sell or license a patent or copyright." '43
The leading case is In re Independent Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation.44
There, the Federal Circuit established the black letter rule that "[i]n the absence of any
indication of illegal tying, fraud in the Patent and Trademark Office, or sham litigation,
the patent holder may enforce the statutory right to exclude others from making, using,
or selling the claimed invention free from liability under the antitrust laws.' 41 In this
case, Xerox had refused to license copyrighted software and sell patented parts and
copyrighted manuals to independent service organizations (ISOs).46 The Federal
Circuit considered the footnote in the Supreme Court's Kodak opinion and concluded
that its effect was limited to cases of tying.47 The court relied on section 271(d) of the
Patent Act, which states that "[n]o patent owner otherwise entitled to relief... shall be
denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by
reason of his having... (4) refused to license or use any rights to the patent .... 48
The Federal Circuit therefore rejected the contention that the Supreme Court in Kodak
had opened the door to antitrust liability for a valid patent holder's refusal to license. It
instead held that Kodak does not "limit the right of the patentee to refuse to sell or
license in markets within the scope of the statutory patent grant."4
9
The only remaining issue is whether In re Independent Service Organizations
Antitrust Litigation accurately reflects the state of U.S. law. One earlier case arguably
stands for a position that is inconsistent with the Federal Circuit's ruling. In Image
Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., the Ninth Circuit found that Kodak
had violated the antitrust laws by refusing to sell patented and unpatented parts and by
declining to license copyrighted and noncopyrighted information to ISOs in
competition with it in the aftermarkets for repairing high-speed copiers.
50
The two cases are not irreconcilable. 51 Kodak involved a company's blanket refusal
to license both intellectual property-protected and unprotected products.52 Nothing in
42. See Miller Insituforn, Inc. v. Insituform of N. Am., Inc., 830 F.2d 606, 609 (6th Cir.
1987) ("A patent owner who lawfully acquires a patent cannot be held liable under Section 2 of
the Sherman Act for maintaining the monopoly power he lawfully acquired by refusing to
license the patent to others."). Copyright holders enjoy similar rights. See Data Gen. Corp. v.
Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1187 (1st Cir. 1994). "Section 1 of the Sherman
Act does not entitle a purchaser to buy a product that the seller does not wish to offer for sale."
Serv. & Training, Inc. v. Data Gen. Corp., 963 F.2d 680, 686 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting Jefferson
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 25 n.40 (1984)).
43. Kodak, 125 F.3dat 1216.
44. 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
45. Id. at 1327.
46. Id. at 1324.
47. Id. at 1327.
48. Id. at 1326 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1999)) (omissions and incorrect statute year in
original).
49. Id. at 1327.
50. 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997).
51. See Michelle M. Burtis & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Why an Original Can Be Better Than a
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the Ninth Circuit's judgment suggested that a company could violate the Sherman Act
by refusing to supply intellectual property alone. Indeed, the court went to some length
to emphasize the legitimacy inherent in such exclusion.
53
Subtle inconsistencies aside, it remains true that U.S. law will not require mandatory
dissemination of intellectual property-protected information-a fact borne out by
subsequent developments. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Verizon Communications, Inc.
v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, recently emphasized that "[w]e have been very
cautious in recognizing [cases in which a duty to share will be imposed], because of the
uncertain virtue of forced sharing and the difficulty of identifying and remedying
anticompetitive conduct by a single firm.",54 Referring to this decision, the head of the
Justice Department's Antitrust Division commented that the Court had "clarified that
there is no basis in U.S. antitrust law for a stand-alone essential facilities doctrine" and
further expressed "profound skepticism that the antitrust laws were intended to create a
duty by one competitor to assist its competitors by assuring them access to its tangible
or intellectual property."
55
The U.S. disavowal of interoperability, as facilitated by compulsory licensing,
stands in marked contrast to Europe. We argue that the latter jurisdiction bears witness
to a novel, and profoundly worrying, antitrust paradox. Myopic focus on low price and
allocative efficiency, although desirable in other settings, threatens to eviscerate the
fundamental incentives that facilitate the operation of information markets.
B. The Broad Dilution of Intellectual Property Rights in Europe
1. EU Law's Path to Compulsory Licensing and Interoperability
Until relatively recently, EC competition law generally held a view comparable to
that held in the United States, respecting the exclusive rights granted by intellectual
property law. Holders of intellectual property rights were entitled to their exclusive
enjoyment, and rivals had no general privilege to access them. Illustratively, in AB
Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd.,56 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) held that the
holder of such property can legitimately refuse to license its technology to rivals. In
pertinent part, it held:
[Tlhe right of the proprietor of a protected design to prevent third parties from
manufacturing and selling or importing, without its consent, products
incorporating the design constitutes the very subject-matter of his exclusive right.
It follows that an obligation imposed upon the proprietor of a protected design to
grant to third parties, even in return for a reasonable royalty, a license for the
supply of products incorporating the design would lead to the proprietor thereof
Copy: Intellectual Property, the Antitrust Refusal to Deal, and ISO Antitrust Litigation, 9
SuPREME CT. ECON. REV. 143 (2001) (arguing "that the purported conflict is largely illusory").
52. Kodak, 125 F.3d at 1219.
53. See id. at 1215-17.
54. 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004).
55. R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant Attorney General, Securing the Benefits of Global
Competition, Address at the Tokyo American Center 16 (Sept. 10, 2004), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/205389.pdf.
56. Case 238/87, AB Volvo v. Erik Veng (UK) Ltd., 1988 E.C.R. 6211.
1166 [Vol. 84:1157
SUCCESS, DOMINANCE, AND INTEROPERABILITY
being deprived of the substance of his exclusive right, and that a refusal to grant
such a license cannot in itself constitute an abuse of a dominant position.
5 7
European law also reflects the view held in the United States that ownership of
intellectual property rights does not by itself immunize the holder from antitrust
liability. As noted by the ECJ, though the ownership of a patent does not equate to a
violation of Article 82 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community ("Article
82 EC"),58 "the use of the patent [could] degenerate into an [improper exploitation of
the protection]." 59 There is nothing improper in this statement of the law, as long as
"improper exploitation" is not construed as encapsulating an entity's decision to keep
the benefits of its technology to itself. European law showed no sign of drawing such
an invidious interpretation until the highly controversial Magill decision of 1988.60
In Magill, an entrepreneur wanted to create a new product-a weekly program
listing for the three television stations broadcasting in the United Kingdom and
Ireland. 61 At the time, the pertinent information was available only on the same day in
newspapers. 62 The three television companies had copyright protection for their
television listings, with the source for that protection coming from state law.63 Few
member states of the EU recognized intellectual property rights for such information.
Magill required a license to offer his prospective product, which was denied by the
three companies. 64
Magill was a paradigmatic case of a holder of an intellectual property right simply
choosing to avail itself of the exclusivity that the right was meant to convey. In a
dramatic ruling, the Commission of the European Communities ("Commission")
nevertheless held that each of the three companies had abused its dominant position,
thereby violating Article 82 EC.65 Accordingly, the Commission required the
companies to provide the pertinent information to Magill and so facilitated the
introduction of the new product. The television companies found no sympathy upon
appeal, either at the CFI or ECJ.66
57. Id. at para. 8.
58. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 65,
available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX: 12002E082:EN:HTML.
Article 82 EC is the European equivalent of section 2 of the Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209
(1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)), and prohibits anticompetitive unilateral
behavior by dominant firms.
59. Case 24/67, Parke, Davis & Co. v. Probel, 1968 E.C.R. 55, 72; cf. United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 63 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that the notion that copyright is a
complete defense to an antitrust offense is "no more correct than the proposition that use of
one's personal property, such as a baseball bat, cannot give rise to tort liability").
60. Commission Decision 89/205, Magill TV Guide/ITP, BBC and RTE, 1989 O.J. (L 78)
43 (EC).
61. See id. at para. 5.
62. See id. at para. 7.
63. See id. at para. 8.
64. See id. at para. 23.
65. See id.
66. See Case C-241/91, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Comm'n, 1995 E.C.R. 1-743; Case T-
69/89, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Comm'n, 1991 E.C.R. 11-485.
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The ECJ held that the violation consisted of the refusal to release "basic"
information by relying on copyright, thereby frustrating the emergence of a new
product for which there was potential consumer demand.67 In addition, the court noted
that there was no objective justification for the refusal and that the effect of the refusal
was to reserve to the television companies the downstream market for television
guides.68
Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of the case was the holding that intellectual
property protection does not constitute an objective justification for excluding others
from the information there at issue. The enormity of this holding is magnified when
one considers that the very raison detre of intellectual property is the right to
exclude.
69
Nevertheless, the case need not be as parlous as first impression might suggest.
Although the court did not say so explicitly, the determinative factor in the legal
analysis was surely the fact that the relevant intellectual property right was weak.70 Few
European countries would have recognized a copyright in television listings
information. 71 More important still, the third-party recipient of the copyrighted
information did not stand in horizontal competition with the copyright holders. Thus,
the television companies were not forced to subsidize rivals or to lose appreciable
money because of the compulsory license.
Most crucially, though, this case was a paradigm for situations in which the ex ante
incentive for innovation is ostensibly unaffected by future compulsory licensing. The
copyright obtained was simply an incident of the primary purpose of the intellectual
property holders' pecuniary investment, namely the creation and promotion of
television programs. Had Magill sought mandatory licensing of the copyright over the
television companies' prime-time shows, no one could seriously posit that the outcome
would have been the same.
Accordingly, it is easy to confine Magill to its facts. The regulators and courts could
look past a seemingly dogmatic defense focused on intellectual property to an apparent
underlying reality-requiring dissemination could enhance consumer welfare without
markedly impacting ex ante incentives. In short, Magill involved some ofthe strongest
possible facts in favor of interoperability.
Yet, as explored below, such a draconian remedy may be ill-advised, even in these
simple and seemingly harmless circumstances. First, one cannot assume that imposing
a compulsory licensing requirement on an unwilling copyright holder has no
diminutive effect on innovation, even where the licensee will not compete with the
reluctant licensor. Were it profit maximizing, the copyright holder would have already
voluntarily licensed its right. The fact that it chose not to implies that it derives greater
67. Radio Telefis Eireann, 1995 E.C.R. 1-743, at para. 54.
68. Id at paras. 55-56.
69. Patents grant an inventor the right to exclude others from making, using, offering to
sell, selling, or importing the patented invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000). Copyright grants
the owner the exclusive right to reproduce the work, prepare derivative works, distribute copies,
perform the work publicly, and display the work publicly. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
Trademarks impose liability for the unauthorized use of a registered mark in certain cases See
15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2006).
70. See RICHARD WIISH, COMPETmON LAw 760 (5th ed. 2003).
71. See id
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utility from employing its exclusive rights.72 A welfarist solution premised on this
ground therefore assumes irrationality-an arguably lethal objection in the context of
corporate incentives.
73
Second, even if interoperability would enhance aggregate welfare on the facts at
hand, larger concerns may nevertheless counsel against compulsory licensing. If the
remedy is likely to be employed in economically unsophisticated or politically
influenced ways-a concern harbored by the authors-narrow exceptions would be
magnified with negative repercussions for social welfare. In other words, cases such as
Magill establish the potentially disturbing precedent that intellectual property rights are
not sacrosanct. The malleable nature of the precedent is accentuated by the nebulous
distinctions upon which the case and others like it lie. In particular, what is the
difference between "weak" and "strong" intellectual property? Such adjectives,
standing alone, are too subjective to be helpful to the administration of the law.
For some time, it was not obvious that Magill had created an unpropitious precedent
that would ultimately facilitate a calamitous decision in Microsoft. Indeed, the
European courts went to some length to read Magill narrowly and to confine the
decision to its specific facts. For example, the ECJ's later decision in Oscar Bronner
GmbH & Co. v. Mediaprint stressed the exceptional circumstances in Magill.74
Nevertheless, more recent signs from the Commission and lower courts were less
encouraging. The most ominous, if not completely erroneous, case was the
Commission's decision in NDC Health Corp. v. IMS Health Inc.75 There, IMS-the
world's leader in data collection on pharmaceutical sales and prescriptions-refused to
license to competitors its copyrighted format for processing regional sales data.76 The
Commission determined that such a license was necessary because the IMS brick
structure had become the de facto industry standard."
On appeal, the ECJ confirmed the statements in Magill that intellectual property
does not provide an objective justification for a refusal to license.7 8 It also held that
such a refusal will constitute an abuse of a dominant position if it prevents the
emergence of a new product for which there is potential demand, and if the refusal is
capable of eliminating all competition on the relevant market.
79
IMS was wrongly decided. Unlike Magill, the facts were not amenable to
interoperable remedies, as the beneficiaries of the mandatory dissemination were in
horizontal competition with the intellectual property holder. More fundamentally, the
copyright pertained directly to the heart of the holder's commercial enterprise. The
intellectual property rights were decidedly "strong" in the sense that we describe
72. One possible explanation may be that the intellectual property holder plans to enter the
relevant market in due course. Altematively, it may be hesitant to allow a potential rival to
develop a conglomerate market that could be used to launch into the copyright-holder's market
in the future.
73. See Louis KAPLOw & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAiRNEss VERSUS WELFARE 462 (2002).
74. See Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. v. Mediaprint, 1998 E.C.R. 1-7791.
75. Case C-481/01 P (R), NDC Health Corp. v. IMS Health, Inc., 2002 E.C.R. 1-340 1.
76. This data was known as the "1860 brick structure." Id. at para. 4.
77. Id. at para. 6.
78. Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. v. NDC Health GMBH & Co., 2004 E.C.R.




below.80 Diminishing those rights is akin to a direct assault on the ex ante incentives
underlying the creation of the technology. Thus, IMS shifted Magill from its defensible,
though we argue economically erroneous, moorings and established the Ordoliberal
principle that rivals should not be denied access to markets and consumers. As
explained in Part III, however, that principle has no place in the regulation of
information markets, where exclusivity is a sine qua non for the proper functioning of
the marketplace.
2. The Microsoft Decision and Europe's Myopic Focus on Interoperability
The decisions in Magill and IMS set the scene for what will likely prove the most
important case for the foreseeable future of EC competition law. In 2004, the CFI
faced the profound question of whether Microsoft's refusal to license information-
including intellectual property-protected code-that would facilitate Windows PC
interoperability with Sun Microsystems' Solaris workgroup server operating systems
violated Article 82 EC.8'
The Commission found that Microsoft's refusal to supply constituted an abuse of its
dominant position, notwithstanding that the information at least partially encompassed
copyright-protected information.82 Despite the fact that Microsoft had relied on its
unchallenged intellectual property right, the company was fined €497 million-at the
time, the largest fine in the history of competition enforcement. 83 The decision
furthered the already worrying precedent of IMS in holding that a copyright holder
does not have the right to exclude that the intellectual property grant purports to
convey. Like IMS, not only was the intellectual property immensely valuable to, and
actively employed by, its holder, but mandatory interoperability directly reduced the
value of the intellectual property and thus the incentive to produce it in the first place.
The Commission placed disturbingly little weight on this fundamental objection to
mandatory interoperability. It held, in conclusory fashion, that:
[O]n balance, the possible negative impact of an order to supply on Microsoft's
incentives to innovate is outweighed by its positive impact on the level of
80. See infra Part III.A.
81. Commission Decision Case COMP/C-3/37.792, Microsoft Corp., 2007 O.J. (L 32) 23
(EC), available at http:i/ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf.
82. See id. at paras. 1005-09.
83. See Q & A: Why the EU Took on Microsoft, CNN, Mar. 24, 2004,
http://www.cnn.com/2004/BUSrNESS/03/24/microsoft.qanda/index.html. In July 2006,
Microsoft was hit with a further E280.5 million fine for noncompliance with the Commission
Decision. See Press Release, European Comm'n, Competition: Commission Imposes Penalty
Payment of £280.5 Million on Microsoft for Continued Non-Compliance with March 2004
Decision (July 12, 2006), available at
http./europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/979&format=HTML&aged=O&l
anguage=EN&guiLanguage=en. Finally, on February 27, 2008, Microsoft was fined a record
£899 million for charging unreasonably high access prices. See Press Release, European
Comm'n, Antitrust: Commission Imposes £899 Million Penalty on Microsoft for Non-
Compliance with March 2004 Decision, (Feb. 27, 2008), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/08/318&format=-HTML&aged=0&l
anguage=EN&guiLanguage=en [hereinafter £899 Million Penalty].
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innovation of the whole industry (including Microsoft). As such, the need to
protect Microsoft's incentives to innovate cannot constitute an objective
justification that would offset the exceptional circumstances identified.8'
The Commission's understanding of innovation reflected axiomatic notions of ex
post competition and static efficiency of the type desirable in traditional markets.85
However, as Part II makes clear, information markets involve different and unique
economic considerations. In particular, the right to exclude is a prerequisite to the
formation of a new economy market. By ensuring rivals the ability to render their
products interoperable with Microsoft's, the Commission no doubt guaranteed that
more options would be available to consumers at lower prices. But this seemingly
utopian outcome will only hold true for one period. Those subsequently seeking to
engage in the costly process of developing valuable information will know that they
may lose the right to recoup the full social value of their innovative efforts. Indeed, it
was inherently clear in the Commission Decision that the more successful and valuable
the intellectual property right, the more likely the company will be found dominant and
thus subject to compulsory licensing requirements.
Any hope that the CFI would address these critically important considerations was
dashed. On September 17, 2007, the court essentially approved the Commission
86Decision in all material aspects. In particular, the court rejected the maximalist
argument that Microsoft had an unqualified right to the exclusive use of its intellectual-
property-protected information.8 7 In doing so, it relied on the Magill and IMS decisions
explored above-thus confirming the dangerous nature of those earlier precedents.
88
Most worryingly, the court broadly construed these cases, holding that not all
competition would have to be eliminated in secondary markets in order to trigger a
duty to share and that hindering the technical development of new products might also
suffice. 9
This provides arguably the perfect example of why this Article counsels against
requiring interoperability, even if situations might exist in which such a remedy would
potentially enhance social welfare. The precedential value of such an exception would
be too easily usurped, expanded, and misapplied with greatly disproportionate social
cost.
90
There is no question that the remedies imposed against Microsoft in Europe far
surpassed their equivalent in the United States, which never contemplated the
mandatory dissemination of copyright-protected information. 91 In short, a considerable
disparity exists between the U.S. and European approaches to dominance founded on
intellectual property.
84. Commission Decision Case COMP/C-3/37.792, at para. 783.
85. See Barnett, supra note 1, at 861 (explaining why traditional conceptions of static
efficiency are ill-placed in the new economy context of valuable information markets).
86. Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Comm'n, 2004 E.C.R. 11-4463, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62004A0201 :EN:HTML.
87. See id. at para. 690.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See infra Part III.A.
91. See PAGE & LOPATKA, supra note 32, at 80-83.
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Part II briefly considers the basic economics required to inform the construction of
optimal rules governing interoperability. The latter task, which constitutes the heart of
this Article, is conducted in Part III.
II. INNOVATION, NETWORK EFFECTS, AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION IN INFORMATION
MARKETS
The new economy has been a lightning rod for vociferous debate on the proper role
of interoperability and compulsory licensing. This Part explains the crucial import of
these issues in modem information markets and identifies the economics underlying the
phenomenon. This discussion precedes and facilitates the central contribution offered
by this Article-namely, the introduction of a novel framework for addressing whether,
and when, an intellectual property holder should be denied the right to exclude.
Robert Bork's famous book, The Antitrust Paradox, argued that ill-informed
competition policy perversely subverted the interests of consumers.92 In particular, he
used microeconomic theory to show that a plethora of business practices forbidden by
the Warren Court were in fact socially beneficial.93 In the time following the
publication of this book, the "Chicago School," of which Bork was a part,
revolutionized antitrust doctrine and led the Supreme Court to overrule many of its
prior decisions. 94 By adopting a price-theoretic approach, whose only concern was
allocative efficiency in the form of lower prices and higher consumer welfare, courts
could distinguish desirable business practices from bad. The paradox, it would seem,
was resolved.
95
The twenty-first century again bears witness to a new antitrust paradox. This time,
however, the effect is localized within the context of "new economy" markets, which
offer information products in the form of computer code, software, digital music, and
the like.96 Ironically, regulation that focuses on concerns of allocative efficiency and
immediate consumer welfare is apt to undermine the efficient operation of information
markets. In this unique context, oddly enough, it appears that "monopoly" may be
entirely desirable. Thus, the application of traditional antitrust principles may be
dangerously counterproductive.
Although the concept of a "competitive monopoly" appears oxymoronic, it may
describe the reality for many industries founded on intellectual property.97 How can
this be? For many good reasons, such market structures are viewed with great
92. See generally BORK, supra note 34.
93. See generally id.
94. See, e.g., Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Economists at the Gate: Antitrust in the
Twenty-First Century, 38 LoY. U. CHi. L.J. 513, 514-15, 536-45 (2007) (describing the
Chicago School's ongoing influence on antitrust policy); see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 2.2b (2d ed. 1999)
(summarizing the Chicago School position); cf William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of
Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double
Helix, 2007 COLum. Bus. L. REv. 1.
95. See BORK, supra note 34, at 3-11. See generally Leegm Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v.
PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007).
96. See SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOvATION AND INCENTIVES 31 (2004).
97. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTrIRUST LAW 248-49 (2d ed. 2001).
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displeasure in traditional industries.98 The answer lies in the idiosyncratic economic
phenomena underlying information markets.
Information products protected by intellectual property typically display network
effects, 99 either direct I°° or indirect.' 0' Such effects--otherwise known as positive
externalities in consumption-have been characterized as pulling the new economy
"toward monopoly yet, oddly, also toward competition."'' 0 2 Such "path dependence"
largely emanates from the fact that the value of a network product increases in tandem
with the number of consumers using it.10 3 The classic example is a telephone
network-a single telephone is of no use to anyone, but as the number subscribing to
the network increases, so too does consumer demand for the marginal phone on offer.
The same principle holds true with all manner of information goods, from computer
code to digital music.104 Coupled with increasing economies of scale in production,' 05
which allow companies to operate with higher efficiency the greater the market share
enjoyed, network effects often lead to a "winner-takes-all" market structure.
Paradoxically, however, the resulting monopoly is not necessarily an inefficient
outcome. 106 Given the low marginal cost of producing information, and the high cost of
developing it, competitive market structures lead to insolvency and suboptimal rates of
innovation. 10 7 Thus, some form of supracompetitive pricing is required to spur the
development of socially desirable goods. An entirely unregulated market will not
facilitate such pricing because information goods display two attributes that together
lead to market failure absent legal intervention. These are nonexcludability and
nonrivalry in consumption.' When products possess both traits-typically because
98. See id. at 9-32 (describing the costs and occasional benefits of monopoly).
99. See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and
Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REv. 424, 424 (1985).
100. Direct network effects, alternatively known as positive externalities in consumption,
arise whenever the utility enjoyed by a consumer of a good increases in response to an increase
in the number of other users of the same good.
101. Indirect network effects arise when an increase in the number of consumers of a product
spurs the creation and manufacture of complementary products. Computer hardware, software,
and operating systems all provide classic examples. In any of these cases, an increase in the
number of users of the primary good increases the demand for products predicated on the use of
that good. As the number of complementary products increases, the demand for the underlying
good similarly rises. This forms a "positive feedback loop." From a price-setting standpoint, the
presence of these complementary effects incentivizes the seller of the primary product to sell at a
lower price than it would absent those effects. Doing so elevates the demand for its product.
102. POSNER, supra note 97, at 248.
103. See Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History,
11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205, 208 (1995).
104. See SCOTCHMER, supra note 96, at 31-32.
105. See POSNER, supra note 97, at 245-46.
106. See generally STAN J. LIEBOwrrz & STEPHEN E. MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS &
MICROSoFT: COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY (1999) (demonstrating that
stable inefficient equilibriums in product markets ascribable to network effects are both
theoretically improbable and empirically rare).
107. See SCOTCHMER, supra note 96, at 35.
108. See generally Joseph E. Stiglitz, Knowledge as a Global Public Good, in GLOBAL
PUBLIC GOODS: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE 21 ST CENTuRY 308 (Inge Kaul, Isabelle
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property rights in them are ill defined'o°-they are known as "public goods.""10
Consequently, consumption of the good by one entity does not diminish the amount
available for consumption by others, and no one can be excluded from enjoying it.
The market failure arises from a collective-action problem."' As with products
offered in traditional markets, information goods can be valuable and their
development can enhance social welfare. Thus, society as a whole would be better off
if everyone agreed to reward the inventor for her efforts in producing the relevant
information. However, each individual consumer lacks an incentive to pay for the
information thus generated: once the information becomes available, it is difficult to
prevent others from freely acquiring it.
The law corrects the problem by bestowing information goods with the trait of
excludability through the intellectual property laws." 12 Thus, the monopoly outcome
decried as the ultimate evil in traditional antitrust analysis can often constitute an
efficient structure in the age of the new economy. Nevertheless, competition remains
crucial to the efficient operation of information markets, taking place in production, as
rivals compete primarily on the basis of quality to capture the monopoly in sequential
rounds. 13
It is precisely this welfare-enhancing role that distinguishes the kind of monopoly
encountered in the information market setting from that found in traditional industries.
Although some have posited that the same network effects that lead to monopoly can
undesirably perpetuate one against even qualitatively superior technologies' -what
may be deemed "excess inertia"''l-neither empiricism nor a more perspicacious
insight supports such a conclusion. Excess inertia may, in fact, be overcome in multi-
period games, which reflect real-life scenarios, as users entice others to follow
adoption of new and superior technologies, or react to inferior ones by switching
back."16 Communication among users and incentives designed to alleviate switching
Grunberg & Marc A. Stem eds., 1999).
109. See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
110. See, e.g., HUGH GRAVELLE& RAY REES, MICRoECONOMICS 326 (3d. ed. 2004); William
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD.
325, 326 (1989).
111. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND
THE THEORY OF GROUPS (197 1) (explaining that individuals do not internalize the social cost of
their consumption of public goods and overconsume accordingly).
112. See, e.g., ROGER E. SCHECHTER& JOHN R. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OFPATENTLAW 11-12
(2004). Patents grant an inventor the right to exclude others from making, using, offering to sell,
selling, or importing the patented invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000). Copyright grants the
owner the exclusive right to reproduce the work, prepare derivative works, distribute copies,
perform the work publicly, and display the work publicly. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
Trademarks impose liability for the unauthorized use of a registered mark in certain cases. See
15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2006).
113. See POSNER, supra note 97, at 248-49.
114. See Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 Am. ECON. REv. 332, 335
(1985); Katz & Shapiro, supra note 99; see also Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal
Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479,488-99 (1998); Liebowitz &
Margolis, supra note 103.
115. See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation,
Product Preannouncements, and Predation, 76 Am. ECON. REv. 940 (1986).
116. See, e.g., Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Should Technology Choice Be a
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costs-including pricing below cost and bundling' ' 7- - can promote the adoption of
new and potentially superior standards.
More fundamentally still, a monopolist's attempt to perpetuate its position by
designing its network goods to be incompatible with its rivals' goods may be self-
destructive." 8 All markets, both traditional and information based, are ultimately
driven by consumer demand. If consumers desire interoperable technologies, their
distaste for a successful standard-setter who refuses to supply them will facilitate entry
by fringe firms. These latter entities are especially likely to enter on the basis of a joint
venture, offering compatible products that will appeal to consumers and that will
displace the incumbent monopolist.119
Perhaps most importantly, though, empirical evidence is to the contrary. 2 ' Judge
Richard Posner, one of the preeminent thinkers in the field of antitrust, has
illustratively written:
[T]he networks that have emerged in the new economy do not seem particularly
secure against competition. We have seen all manner of firms rise and fall in this
industry-falling sometimes from what had seemed a secure monopoly position.
The gale of creative destruction that Schumpeter described, in which a sequence of
temporary monopolies operates to maximize innovation that confers social benefits
far in excess of the social costs of the short-lived monopoly prices that the process
also gives rise to, may be the reality of the new economy.121
Since 2001, subsequent events have strongly reinforced Judge Posner's
observations. Illustratively, Microsoft-for the past decade, the quintessential
unstoppable monopolist-has started to find itself in a decidedly inferior position to
Google. 22 Driving this displacement, and other instances of displacement, is
consumers' overwhelming focus on technological quality over mere price alone.' 23
The role played by intellectual property protection is thus clear-it facilitates the
emergence of valuable markets in information. The role of antitrust is less obvious.
One reasonable argument would be that competition law has absolutely no place
diluting intellectual property rights. 124 One interpretation of this view would allow
Concern ofAntitrust Policy?, 9 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 283 (1996).
117. See George L. Priest, Rethinking Antitrust Law in anAgeofNetworklndustries 8 n.9, 9
(John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Research Paper No.
352, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=-1031166.
118. See SCOTCHMER, supra note 96, at 298-305.
119. Seeid.
120. See POSNER, supra note 97, at 248. See generally Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 103
(arguing that deleterious path dependence is not a problem with market economies).
121. POSNER, supra note 97, at 249.
122. See Alan Sipress, Vista Arrives in Changed Landscape: Microsoft Faces Web
Competitors, WASH. POST, Jan. 30,2007, at DOI. This is perhaps best evidenced by Microsoft's
bold move to acquire Yahoo! in the hope of better competing with Google. Yet even this
combination would be hard-pressed to compete with Google in the Web search market. See, e.g.,
Mike Musgrove & Cecilia Kang, Microsoft-Yahoo Union Would Still Be No. 2, WASH. POST,
Feb. 2, 2008, at DOI.
123. POSNER, supra note 97, at 249-50 (noting that quality competition tends to dominate
price competition in the new economy setting).
124. For such a view, see Kenneth Glazer, The IMS Health Case: A US. Perspective, 13
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inventors to do whatever they must to capture the full value oftheir inventions.125 They
should be able to set prices at monopoly levels, refuse to license their technology to
rivals, and design their products to be noninteroperable with competitors' goods. This
position may be deemed the maximalist perspective.'
26
An alternative, though not necessarily divergent, view is that society should reduce
levels of monopoly power to the lowest extent possible, while still maintaining the
level required to spur the relevant innovation. This is the parsimonious perspective.'
27
Interestingly, however, due to the information asymmetry and imperfection issues
discussed below, one is likely to adopt the same rule irrespective of which approach
one adheres to. This is especially true if we attempt to approach the problem through
the intellectual property laws-as we believe policy makers generally should.
28
To this end, society should reduce the breadth and/or duration of intellectual
property rights awarded ex ante to the point where the marginal improvement in ex
post allocative efficiency equals the marginal loss in ex ante incentives. The ensuing
property right, when awarded, should then be unwaveringly protected and relevant
holders' decisions to refuse to license the right should be respected. Thus, we adopt a
parsimonious perspective in formulating the intellectual property right, but then adhere
to maximalist principles by allowing holders to derive the full value of the rights
awarded.
Obviously, the preceding insight does not solve the problem-indeed, it raises
another one: how can policy makers identify the precise level of ex post profitability
that will drive an appropriate level of ex ante research? Compounding the difficulty of
this determination is the fact that the threshold will fluctuate significantly depending on
the context and traits of each innovator and market. Lacking determinative insight into
GEo. MASON L. REV. 1197, 1204-08 (2006) (recognizing that although competition laws would
seem to yield positive results, they should still be avoided in normal circumstances); see also
Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent
Law, 5 J. EcoN. PERSP. 29, 31 (1991) ("[T]he only way to ensure that firms undertake every
research project that is efficient is to let the firms collect as revenue all the social value they
create. Otherwise, some projects that are socially desirable will not be undertaken.").
125. Of course, this would not entail the adoption of measures designed to derive greater
value than was within the purview of the intellectual property right. For instance, a patent holder
should not be able to enter into an exclusionary agreement with a rival, agreeing that the latter
will stay out of the relevant market for a period exceeding the temporal duration of the patent.
See Alan Devlin, Exclusionary Tactics in the Hatch-Waxman Context, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV.
631,651-53.
126. Despite its initially attractive quality, however, the idea that an inventor should be
allowed to extract the full social value of her invention is surely erroneous. Granting inventors
greater monopoly returns than are needed to induce the relevant innovation creates social harm
in the form of allocated inefficiency without a concomitant benefit. See, e.g., Michael
Abramowicz, The Uneasy Case for Patent Races over Auctions, 60 STAN. L. REv. 803, 812
(2007). Nevertheless, there may still be good reason to address this issue through the intellectual
property laws alone, with the result that antitrust rules should have no role in constraining
profit-generating conduct of patentees as long as that conduct falls within the purview of the
relevant patents.
127. See, e.g., Harry First, Controlling the Intellectual Property Grab: Protect Innovation,
Not Innovators, 38 RUTGERs L.J. 365, 380-81 (2007).
128. See Glazer, supra note 124, at 1197 (discussing the European Commission's attempt to
regulate IMS's dominance in the German pharmaceutical market).
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the relevant threshold, all society can do is employ heuristic rules that seek to balance
these offsetting goals.
This Article does not seek to demarcate the ever-elusive point at which the
monopoly cost-incentive trade-off maximizes aggregate welfare. Instead, it is
concerned with a specific problem-in what circumstances, if any, is it desirable to
truncate intellectual property rights ex post via the antitrust laws to accommodate the
entry of the holders' rivals into the market? Adopting a heuristic approach that seeks to
minimize Type I errors, we conclude in Part III that the answer is never. Scenarios
exist in which the remedy of compulsory interoperability could conceivably enhance
aggregate welfare. Nevertheless, they are apt to be both so rare and difficult to evaluate
that the most efficient rule is to respect otherwise valid intellectual property rights as
inviolable. Absent an unrelated antitrust violation that threatens to foreclose consumer
access to dynamic innovation, interoperability should be the property holder's
exclusive prerogative.
This normative position is derived from the preceding economic literature, but what
of empirical evidence governing the possible effect of intellectual property dilution?
Recent studies have confirmed the positive impact of strong intellectual property
protection on economic growth and implicitly highlight the dangers of diluting such
rights. Illustratively, Falvey, Greenaway, and Foster investigated the impact of
intellectual property on economic growth in panel data of eighty countries for four
five-year periods (1975-79, 1980-84, 1985-89, and 1990-94) and found that, while
the impact of intellectual property protection on growth depends upon the level of
development, patent and copyright protection are positively and significantly related to
growth for low- and high-income countries. 129 They conclude that intellectual property
protection encourages innovation in high-income countries and technology flows to
low-income countries.' Despite a lack of evidence regarding a significant relationship
between intellectual property right protection and economic growth for middle-income
countries, the authors emphasized that there was no indication that protecting
intellectual property rights reduced growth. 31 Of paramount importance are these
conclusions:
Our results indicate that countries with high per capita incomes are likely to grow
more rapidly the stronger their IPR protection....
129. See Rod Falvey, David Greenaway & Neil Foster, Intellectual Property Rights and
Economic Growth (Internationalisation of Economic Policy Research Paper Series, Paper No.
2004/12, 2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=715982; see also David M. Gould &
William C. Gruben, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Economic Growth, 48 J. DEV.
ECON. 323, 328-46 (1996) (analyzing data on ninety-five countries from 1960 to 1988); Mark
A. Thompson & Francis W. Rushing, An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Patent Protection
on Economic Growth, 21 J. ECON. DEv. 61, 61-79 (1996) (estimating cross-section growth
regressions of up to 112 countries from 1970 to 1985).
130. See Falvey et al., supra note 129, at 16-17.
131. Id. at 17.
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Finally, it should be emphasised that while IPR protection appears not to
exhibit significant growth-enhancing effects for middle-income countries, nowhere
do we find evidence that stronger IPR protection reduces growth.
Moreover, Kanwar and Evenson analyzed empirically the influence of intellectual
property right protection on innovation and technological change, finding evidence that
showed "unambiguously, that intellectual property protection (proxied by an index of
patent rights) has a strong positive effect on technological change (proxied by research
and development investment expenditures), and therefore on economic growth.' '
Furthermore, Nobel Laureate Douglass North has criticized traditional static
economic theory for being "a frictionless theory in a world in which the frictions are
where the action is and it is static in a world in which dynamic change is going on at an
unprecedented rate."' 34 He proposed modifications "in the spirit of Joseph
Schumpeter" to make the theory apt for understanding performance of economies
through time. 35 Describing the "wedding of science and technology" as an economic
revolution "which is the underlying determinant of modem productivity,"', 36 and
revitalizing the Schumpeterian theory, North argues that:
Sustaining such growth into the future depends on successfully dealing with two
fundamental issues: 1/that the stock of (useful) knowledge continue[s] to grow at
something like constant returns and 2/that the costs of transactng [sic] (reflecting
the costs arising from human interacton [sic]) do not grow more rapidly than the
productivity gains from improvements arising from the increments to the stock of
knowledge. I don't regard either of these issues as having necessariy [sic] positive
outcomes.137
North's alert about the dynamics of economic change is especially relevant for
contextualizing our analysis below:
The rate of learning determines the speed of economic change; the kind of learning
determines the direction of economic change. The kind of learning is a function of
the expected pay-offs of different kinds of knowledge and therefore will reflect the
mental models of the players and most immediately at the margin, the incentive
structure embodied in the institutional matrix (which consists of the framework of
interconnected institutions that together make up the formal rules of an economy).
If the institutional matrix rewards piracy (or more generally redistributive
132. Id. (first and second emphases added; third emphasis in original).
133. Sunil Kanwar & Robert E. Evenson, Does Intellectual Property Protection Spur
Technological Change? 3 (Yale Univ. Econ. Growth Ctr., Paper No. 831, 2001), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=275322.
134. Douglass C. North, Institutions, Organizations and Market Competition 1 (Dec. 17,
1996) (unpublished essay), available at http://129.3.20.41/eps/eh/papers/9612/9612005.pdf.
135. Id. at 1.
136. Id. at 3; see also Falvey et al., supra note 129, at 17; Gould & Gruben supra note 129,
at 323, 328-46 (analyzing data on ninety-five countries from 1960 to 1988); Thompson &
Rushing, supra note 129, at 61-79 (estimating cross-section growth regressions of up to 112
countries from 1970 to 1985).
137. North, supranote 134, at 11.
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activities) more than productive activity, then learning will take the form of
learning to be better pirates.1 38
Thus, in the context of the current economic revolution based on information
markets, the institutional matrix composed of the antitrust and intellectual property
laws must not halt the growth in the stock of knowledge through reduction of ex ante
incentives. Nor should the matrix be allowed to increase transaction costs, elevating the
cost of an interoperability-prone regime.
III. IDENTIFYING THE OPTIMAL RULE FOR INTEROPERABILITY
A. Diminishing Ex Ante Investment Incentives Through the Antitrust Laws Is Never
Justified
The question of whether interoperability should ever be required is a daunting one.
Precise conclusions are elusive: the economics of information markets are complex, the
ultimate competitive consequences of powerful network effects are abstruse, and the
commercial repercussions of erroneous policy are potentially devastating.
Nevertheless, we believe there is good reason to place special weight on this last
factor-prudent competition rules, like laws generally, seek to minimize Type I errors
when the cost of erroneously rejecting the hypothesis is large. 139 Applied to the
question of interoperability, mistakenly accepting the view that compulsory licensing
will elevate long-run aggregate welfare could be disastrous, given the potential
foreclosure of future innovation. This alone should be dispositive on the question of
interoperability. Simply put, the cost of mistakenly reducing ex ante incentives through
an excessive attack on ex post profitability is prohibitive.
"Quick-fix" solutions appear awfully tempting to competition enforcers faced with
dominant companies, whose positions are fortified by profitable intellectual
property. 140 The level of profitability enjoyed by successful innovators can be quite
astounding,' 4' the harm caused to rivals explicit, and the calls by consumers for
intervention clamorous.142 Indeed, there is no question that imposing interoperability
138. Id. at 10.
139. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm, Normal Science, or Crumbling Construct?
Trends in Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation Reform, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 659, 697-98
(1993).
140. See Barnett, supra note 1, at 861 ("Access and redistribution can be a tempting
'Christmas dinner' under a short term, static view, but this is ultimately misguided. The
temptation persists even where the innovation has solved a vexing problem that everyone admits
used to exist, and even where consumers flock to the innovation despite the availability of
alternatives."); see also Glazer, supra note 124, at 1198.
141. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 1, at 863. A good example is provided by the
pharmaceutical industry, the profits of which result from patent-protected innovation. In the
first half of 2006, the profits enjoyed by the top ten U.S. drug manufacturers totaled almost forty
billion dollars. See HENRY A. WAXMAN, ANALYSIS: PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY PROFrTS
INCREASE BY OVER $8 BILuON AFTER MEDICARE DRUG PLAN GOES INTO EFFECT 2 tbl. 1 (2006),
available at
http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20060919115623-70677.pdf.
142. See Bamett, supra note 1, at 862-63; see also Glazer, supra note 124, at 1207 (noting
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on a market monopolized on the basis of intellectual property will enhance consumer
welfare in the short run.143 Courts, authorities, and regulators harboring good
intentions, and seeking to aid consumers, can easily be enticed by the ostensibly perfect
and simple remedy immediately available. 144 Nevertheless, such temptation must be
resisted.
The legitimacy and importance of this argument stem from the following
considerations: First, seemingly excessive ex post profitability is poor ground for
diminishing intellectual property rights. Second, markets will self-correct if
competition law fails to facilitate interoperability when it should; but the harm caused
by erroneously insisting on this remedy will continue in perpetuity. This harm strongly
suggests that we should choose to respect an intellectual property holder's right to
exclude in close cases. Third, antitrust enforcers should be loath to require
interoperability on the ground of competitor complaint alone-doing so would
undermine the entire competitive process in innovation and establishment.
145
Successful research and acquisition of profitable intellectual property will necessarily
injure the innovator's competitors. 46 Fourth, and uniquely, even consumer calls for
action should be discounted. Information markets in which meaningful competition
properly takes place in invention, rather than production, hide the immediate presence
and benefit of that competition from consumer eyes. Once a technology exists,
consumers are apt to be myopic advocates for interoperability, as they understandably
want the best of both worlds-innovation and low prices. Part II explained why this
combination is not sustainable in the context of information goods. Fifth, and last, to
the extent society adheres to the "natural rights" argument that an inventor should be
entitled to the fruits of his invention, 147 this consideration weighs against
interoperability. We will now address these points in finer detail.
that over forty customers testified on behalf of IMS's competitors, while none testified on IMS's
behalf).
143. See Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network
Industries, 68 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 27 (2001) (noting that the consumer benefits from
interoperability can be substantial).
144. See Barnett, supra note 1, at 861.
145. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) ("The
successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins.");
see also Congressman Jack Brooks, Remarks at Symposium in Commemoration of the Sixtieth
Anniversary of the Establishment of the Antitrust Division (Jan. 10, 1994), in 39 ANTiTRUST
BULL. 841, 843 (1994) ("The economic philosophy behind the antitrust laws is a tough
philosophy. [They] recognize that competition means someone may go bankrupt. They do not
contemplate a game in which everyone who plays can win.") (quoting Thurman Arnold).
146. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusive Joint Ventures andAntitrust Policy, 1995 COLUM.
Bus. L. REv. 1, 25 (showing graphically the effect on an industry of a marketwide drop in
demand).
147. See, e.g., Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287,
296-330 (1988) (discussing Locke's labor-justification theory, as interpreted by the value-added
theory); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51
01O ST. L.J. 517, 523-29 (1990) (discussing the history of natural law as it has applied to
copyright law).
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1. Ex Post Profitability Provides No Normative Justification for Interoperability
Immensely valuable intellectual property provides an attractive, but dangerous,
ground for imposing interoperability. This is particularly so when there is an apparent
asymmetry between the capital invested in the process of innovation ex ante ant the
financial rewards obtained ex post. Even informed regulators-those aware of the
danger of reducing ex post profits below the threshold required to spur desirable rates
of innovation-may conclude that when enormous profits flow to the monopolist,
interoperability would not dampen the incentives necessary to spur the pertinent
innovation. Interestingly, the European Commission adheres to this principle. One of
its discussion papers opines that "the investments behind innovations leading to
intellectual property rights may not have been particularly significant, in which case it
may be likely that the investment would have been made even knowing that a duty to
supply would be imposed."'
148
This view, though eminently defensible in a world of highly symmetric and near-
perfect information, is an extremely dangerous proposition in our world of information
asymmetry and imperfection. The magic threshold is likely immeasurable in most
instances and the prospect of a Type I error (reducing profitability below this level)
inherent in a rule mandating disclosure could be disastrous.
In addition, although the level of profitability being enjoyed by a monopolist may
sometimes seem grossly excessive, those profits may appear considerably less extreme
when discounted to their ex ante level and adjusted for risk. This latter factor in
particular may elude regulators because of the familiar concept of "hindsight bias.' 4 9
As disproportionate as they might seem, large ex post profits may be the necessary
reward for an inventor to engage in costly ex ante research whose probability of
success is remote. 150 Recall that information markets are distinguishable from
traditional industries on account of network and tipping effects.' 5' In traditional
markets, even if an entrant were a second or third mover, it could still enter with a
reasonably homogeneous product and compete for market share on the basis of
price. 152 There may be no such secure entry into network markets with an
148. EUROPEAN COMM'N, DG COMPETITION DISCUSSION PAPER ON THE APPLICATION OF
ARTICLE 82 OF THE TREATY TO ExCLUSIONARY ABUSES, para. 236 (Dec. 2005), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf.
149. For an empirical study of the effect of hindsight bias in patent law, see Gregory N.
Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration That the Hindsight Bias Renders
Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391 (2006).
150. For instance, the pharmaceutical industry trade group PhRMA reported that the cost of
discovering, researching, and developing a new drug was approximately $800 million in 2000.
PHRMA, WHAT GOES INTO THE COST OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS? ... AND OTHER QUESTIONS
ABOUT YOUR MEDICINES 2 (2005), available at
http://www.phrma.org/files/Cost of PerscriptionDrugs.pdf. Yet, the same organization
estimates that fewer than one in five drug development efforts results in a successful drug. See
SCOTCHMER, supra note 96, at 41. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology,
58 STAN. L. REv. 601,629 (2005) (arguing that patents provide the necessary incentive for drug
companies to endure the long and uncertain research and development process).
151. See DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
393-94 (4th ed. 2005).
152. See id. at 78-79 (commenting on empirical evidence of entry in traditional markets).
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homogeneous good. It is possible that network effects and consumer lock-in foreclose
entry by a second mover, even if the company offers its product at a lower price.'
5 3
This is not an academic point: consider Apple's predicament in Europe. 1'4 Antitrust
enforcers looking at iTunes, FairPlay, and the iPhone are apt to forget the precarious,
risk-filled, and highly uncertain process by which Apple competed to establish its
dominance. In an environment where online dissemination of free (and illegal) media
was available from myriad sources, and a viable commercial platform based on
legitimate consumer purchases looked increasingly remote, Apple somehow
succeeded. 155 Let us recall also that the company failed many times before it
prevailed.156 Now that the company is reaping the rewards of its hard-earned success, it
is under attack by consumer groups, legislators, and regulators who seem oblivious to
the past competition in establishment and appear to take the technology for granted. 57
One should bear in mind that the risk experienced by a prospective innovator from
rival entry is inherent in the ex ante invest/do not invest calculation. Systemic in this
calculus will be the effect of exclusive design, or a decision to refuse to license code,
on consumer demand. The ultimate investment decision will reflect a trade-off between
the enhanced revenue flowing from exclusivity, on one hand, and the consumer
discontent from noninteroperability that may fuel successful entry by competitors, on
the other. In making this determination, a prospective inventor needs to rely on the
security of iis right to exclude. Indeterminate laws governing mandatory access
increase the stochastic quality of patents and copyrights, thus upsetting an investor's ex
ante research calculus.
Of course, it may be that profits are indeed so high that compulsory interoperability
would not have resulted in suboptimal rates of ex ante innovation. The problem,
however, is that large profits are not necessarily excessive from an ex ante perspective.
The level of expected ex post profitability that will compensate an innovator for its risk
will be heavily context-specific. We argue that the legislature can best deal with this by
passing industry-specific legislation.
158
153. See id. at 393-94.
154. This is the example given by the head of the U.S. Department of Justice's Antitrust
Division. See Barnett, supra note 1, at 861-66.
155. See id. at 861-63.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 864-66; Sobel, supra note 19, at 268.
158. In the pharmaceutical industry, for example, Congress saw fit to pass the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 ("Hatch-Waxman Act"), Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 28, and 35 U.S.C.),
because legislators had determined that the level of ex post profitability flowing from a patent
was excessive given the harm to allocated efficiency and consumer welfare. See generally
Devlin, supra note 125, at 638 (noting that the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act was to
encourage generic drug development and entry into the market). It was appropriate for Congress
to act in this regard, but we opine that courts would have had no place ordering patent holders to
grant licenses to their rivals in order to reduce the price of drugs and facilitate the entry of
generics.
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2. Free Market Considerations Counsel Against Interoperability
Even if exceptionally large monopoly profits might (improperly) persuade
regulators that intervention in the form of compulsory licensing is warranted, a second
policy against taking such action warrants consideration. This policy emanates from the
self-correcting nature of the free market.15 9
Imagine a scenario in which an antitrust authority sees a single dominant company
whose position is protected by intellectual property. Given its scale and the desirability
of its products, the company enjoys enormous profits that appear grossly excessive
given the ostensibly limited resources required to develop the patented or copyrighted
technology. The company's rivals demand intervention in the form of interoperability.
Faced with this scenario, an antitrust enforcer has two options-first, it can attack the
monopolist on antitrust grounds, arguing that the exclusivity inherent in the intellectual
property grant is outweighed by consumer harm in the form of monopoly pricing, and
thus require compulsory licensing. Alternatively, the authority can simply do nothing
and respect the decision on interoperability as the intellectual property holder's
prerogative. From a normative perspective formulated on the basis of perfect,
symmetric information, the superior course of action will be to opt for interoperability
if the short-run boon to consumers outweighs the harm to ex ante incentives. From a
real-life perspective, however, characterized as it is by imperfect and asymmetric
information, it is difficult, if not impossible, to conduct this analysis reliably. As a
result, the foregoing section argued that even enormous ex post profits provide shaky
grounds for assuming that compulsory licensing is an appropriate remedy. However, a
second consideration also affects the formulation of responsible policy in an
information-deprived environment.
If a regulator mistakenly denies interoperability or compulsory licensing remedies,
unnecessary deadweight loss and consumer wealth transfers will result. Crucially,
however, that loss will be short-lived. Those profits will attract future entry and further
innovation. 160 We have seen that monopolies founded on intellectual property are, in
fact, quite insecure. 161 Indeed, it is the existence of monopoly profits that leads to the
creative destruction that defines the new economy.162 In addition, if consumers deem
interoperability critical, there is good reason to think that fringe or future entry will
take place on an interoperable basis. 163 In short, the harm caused by mistaken non-
action is ephemeral and limited.
In contrast, if a court erroneously grants interoperable or licensing remedies, the
future of the entire market is placed at risk. The next generation of technology may
never arrive, arrive significantly prorogued, or be of less quality than it otherwise
would. None of these eventualities is a boon for consumers. Most importantly, though,
159. For the classic expression of this point, see Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of
Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1, 1-2 (1984).
160. See id. (arguing that antitrust enforcers are better off erring on the side of
underenforcement because the free market will correct anticompetitive practices mistakenly
sanctioned).
161. See PosNER, supra note 97, at 249.
162. See id.
163. See SCOTCHMER, supra note 96 at 298-305 (explaining the economics of how and why
firms elect to create interoperable or proprietary standards).
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the loss in this case cannot self-correct through the market. 164 As articulated above,
intellectual property rights exist so that a market can function; taking those rights away
undermines the market and all associated consumer welfare. Failing to reduce
monopoly profits entails a far lesser loss.
3. Harm to Rivals Is Irrelevant
In any case where an inventor successfully develops profitable intellectual property,
its rivals will be injured. Vociferous calls for intervention are therefore unsurprisingly
common. Yet, harm to competitors is a manifestly poor impetus for launching a
regulatory attack on a dominant firm's intellectual property.1 65 Likely the most
common mistake in antitrust analysis involves mistaking harm to competitors for harm
to the competitive process. 166 Quite to the contrary, some of the most desirable and
procompetitive business practices will involve appreciable, sometimes fatal, harm to
rivals.' 67 Any time a company lowers price, increases quality, or engages in beneficial
innovation, it augments aggregate welfare, but hurts its rivals.' 68
Rather than relying on the fact of competitor injury, courts and competition
authorities would be far better off assuming that the following is invariably true:
whenever an injured rival complains of its competitor's "anticompetitive" actions,
those actions should be presumed procompetitive. 169 Although this would be an
imperfect rule, it would be infinitely preferable to the all-too-common phenomenon of
regulatory capture. 170 We argue that the European Commission is especially prone to
error, given its recurrent habit of catering to businesses injured by dominant
164. See Easterbrook, supra note 159, at 2-3.
165. See William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Use ofAntitrust to Subvert Competition,
28 J.L. & ECON. 247, 251-56 (1985) (explaining that antitrust laws may serve more to aid in the
stranglehold of monopolies than to encourage competition).
166. See BORK, supra note 34, at 79-80; see also Milton Friedman, The Business
Community's Suicidal Impulse, CATO POL'Y REP., Mar./Apr. 1999, at 6, 7, available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/policyreport/v2 In2/cpr399.pdf (declaring in exasperation that the
antitrust laws should be scrapped for doing more harm than good).
167. See Ball Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Mut. Hosp. Ins. Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1338 (7th Cir.
1986) ("Competition is a ruthless process. A firm that reduces cost and expands sales injures
rivals-sometimes fatally.... These injuries to rivals are byproducts of vigorous competition,
and the antitrust laws are not balm for rivals' wounds."). Fortunately, the law is generally aware
of this fact. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477,489 (1977)
(holding that injured rivals lack standing for damages if their injury results from increased
competition).
168. "Competition is ruthless, unprincipled, uncharitable, unforgiving-and a boon to
society, Adam Smith reminds us, precisely because of those qualities that make it a bane to other
producers." Composite Marine Propellers, Inc. v. Van Der Woude, 962 F.2d 1263, 1268 (7th
Cir. 1992) (quoting Adam Smith with approval).
169. Milton Friedman illustratively declared in exasperation that the antitrust laws should be
scrapped for doing more harm than good. See Friedman, supra note 166, at 7. While we do not
endorse this extreme position, we do emphasize that adhering to Friedman's charge would be a
far superior heuristic than finding antitrust violations on the ground of injury to rivals.
170. See Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest,
and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 167, 195 (1990).
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undertakings. Indeed, all the cases we consider here involved the Commission acting
on the complaints of rivals, not of consumers. This is a tragic mistake.
Why should we be skeptical about competitor complaints in the context of
information markets? The reason is as simple as it is powerful: given the economic
operation of these markets, and the "winner-takes-all" tipping effects typically
encountered, it will always be the case that some companies having devoted great
effort and capital to the innovative process will fail in the market. As a result, there will
invariably be "sore losers" eager to seek pecuniary compensation through the
competition laws. Moreover, they will often be sympathetic. Their products may be
every bit as attractive and efficacious as those offered by the dominant incumbent; their
pricing may even be lower; their entry may simply have been too late. But none of
these facts supports a valid antitrust claim.17
If courts fail to pierce the shroud surrounding a case taken by a disappointed
competitor, they will inadvertently impose rules antithetical to the economic
functioning of the marketplace. Imagine a legal environment in which failed entrants
could recover their losses from the dominant incumbent where the latter refused to
issue a license or render its product interoperable. Such a setting would frustrate the
emergence of future innovative markets, or at the very least would result in inferior
products over an elongated time period. Why would individual companies compete
when they know they cannot truly win? 72
4. Even Consumer Complaints Must Be Discounted
Antitrust analysis is best formulated on grounds of either consumer or aggregate
welfare. Under both standards of review, consumer injury normally provides good
ground for intervention. Thus, regulators are wise to focus their efforts on cases
involving consumer rather than rival complaint. Doing so reinforces the principle that
the antitrust laws protect competition, not competitors. 1
73
Uniquely, however, focusing on consumer complaints in information markets may
not be a prudent tactic. This brings us to our fourth point. The phenomenon of post-
innovation recoupment may be unique among other business practices because it is as
likely to trigger consumer complaint as it is to rile competitors.174 However, consumer
myopia may be a real risk in the context of network industries--once a technology
exists, consumers take its existence for granted, and will not want to pay monopoly
prices, preferring an eclectic product range. Catering to these demands, though, may
eviscerate innovation incentives in much the same way as above, leading to far more
serious, long-run consumer harm.
If neither competitor nor consumer complaint provides a reliable basis for inferring
that an intellectual property holder has abused its position, what is a court or authority
to do? This Article propounds a simple answer-antitrust enforcers should adhere to
the rule that intellectual property rules are to be respected and interoperability
171. See Barnett, supra note 1, at 865-67.
172. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) ("The
successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins.").
173. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
174. In more traditional settings, lower prices constitute an efficient outcome in which
consumers are happy and rivals are displeased.
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considerations avoided. This applies with equal force to cases where the grounds for
interoperability appear compelling. Even then, it is likely that ex ante incentives would
be affected. We would allow for a divergent view, but only in a future state of the
world in which all courts and regulators act in sophisticated manner, driven by
respectable economic theories of consumer or aggregate harm. In such an environment,
a limited number of cases may exist where interoperability would promote welfare.
Part III.B explores such possible circumstances. However, regulators should impose
interoperability only where the economic case for doing so is compelling and where
good reason exists to believe that the precedential value of the decision will be limited
to the highly context-specific situation in which it was applied. We are skeptical as to
whether such an environment will arrive in the foreseeable future.
5. Natural Rights Support Exclusivity
Fifth, and last, is the natural rights argument. While we do not adhere to the notion
that a creator's natural right to control the use of its invention should trump
considerations of aggregate welfare,17 5 where there is a question about which path will
promote that welfare, deontological concerns should arguably have some relevance. In
this case, natural rights counsel strongly against an ex post dilution in intellectual
property rights, whether through interoperability or compulsory licensing. This
provides yet further ground for respecting the right of a patent or copyright holder to
refuse to license its valuable, protected information.
The following Subpart considers situations in which it is possible that
interoperability may enhance aggregate welfare. We show that, even in these seemingly
compelling circumstances, compulsory licensing is likely unpropitious.
B. Are Interoperability and Compulsory Licensing Remedies Desirable in Limited
Cases?
This Article has argued that interoperability and compulsory licensing remedies are
necessarily improper where their imposition would appreciably diminish ex ante
incentives to innovate. This naturally raises the question, however, as to whether those
remedies may legitimately be employed in circumstances where they would not affect
such incentives. More fundamentally still, might such circumstances exist? We find
that though the answer to this last question is yes, it nevertheless remains the case that
interoperable remedies should be avoided.
Where compulsory licensing enhances consumer welfare without reducing ex ante
investment, considerations of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency require interoperability because
the immediate increase in consumer welfare through lower price and higher output,
coupled with a de minimis effect on future innovation rates, dictates that long-run
aggregate welfare will be maximized by imposing the remedy.
76
175. The Supreme Court shares this perspective. See Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City,
383 U.S. 1, 5-10 (1966). However, not everyone shares this utilitarian view. It is clear that
natural rights arguments had, and continues to have, a powerful role in the formulation and
substantiation of patent and copyright rules. See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 147, at 296-330;
Yen, supra note 147, at 523-29.
176. An exchange is Kaldor-Hicks efficient where it enhances net social welfare, but leaves
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The problem, of course, lies 'in accurately and reliably demarcating the
circumstances in which innovation rates will not be correlated with expected
exclusivity. As one might imagine, the situations where this will necessarily hold true
are limited, and significant Type I errors in this field are unacceptable. We start with
the one instance in which the legal system quite properly deprives an intellectual
property holder of its exclusivity. We then offer two scenarios in which interoperability
may appear to be legitimate, though. we show that even here the remedy is apt to be
inappropriate.
We conclude with an initial discussion that Part IV develops-namely, the extent to
which interoperable remedies should play a role in the new economy setting, if at all.
In our view, antitrust regulators should never conclude that a refusal to supply
constitutes monopolization, but might legitimately require compulsory licensing as a
remedy where the legal standards of monopolization are otherwise met. In particular,
the threat in the new economy setting lies in a monopolist frustrating the
Schumpeterian process of competition by foreclosing the arrival of superior standards.
In circumstances where the Sherman Act's requirements of a dangerous probability of
success are met, 77 interoperability may effectively counter harm to the competitive
process.
1. Cases of Invalidity, Fraud, or Sham Litigation
Where intellectual property is invalid or fraudulently acquired, rivals should
obviously enjoy unfettered access to the information. Conversely, the holder of such a
"right" should not enjoy any exclusivity.
What of cases where the intellectual property right has not yet been legally deemed
invalid? Clearly, the holder of an invalid patent or copyright who is aware of that
invalidity should not be allowed to wield the property right as a coercive tool.
Permitting such an entity to do so would entail ex post losses to allocative efficiency
without a concomitant benefit in the form of enhanced ex ante incentives to invest in
innovation. The U.S. Supreme Court has correctly established that attempting to
enforce an invalid patent violates the antitrust laws where the patentee "obtained the
patent by knowingly and willfully misrepresenting facts to the [PTO]."17 Additionally,
the Federal Circuit has held that fraudulent omissions before the PTO may result in
illegality. 179 Of course, differentiating patents rendered invalid on the basis of
deliberate fraud from those deemed invalid on a technical basis is of the utmost
at least one party worse off than he was ex ante. See POSNER, supra note 13, at 13; see also
Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211,
1221-27 (1991) (describing Kaldor-Hicks or potential Pareto superiority).
177. See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993) (holding that a
plaintiff seeking to establish a violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act "must prove (1) that the
defendant has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct with (2) a specific intent to
monopolize and (3) a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power"); see also Times-
Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 626 (1953); Lorain Journal Co. v. United
States, 342 U.S. 143, 153-55 (1951).
178. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach.& Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965).




importance. Failing to do so would have a tremendously negative chilling effect on
innovation. Fortunately, the law is alert to such a danger.'
s8
Obviously, the definition of "sham" is an important question. Should a subjective
test be applied, under which a lawsuit would be illegal if brought in a manner
indifferent to the outcome or for a predatory motive, or should an objective metric of
likely success be applied? The U.S. Supreme Court eventually answered this question
by adopting an amalgamated, two-part test: First, "the lawsuit must be objectively
baseless in the sense that no reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the
merits. ' ' 81 Second, if the suit is objectively baseless, the court should examine the
litigant's subjective motivation.' 2
These rules are sensible and narrowly tailored to avoid the risk of overbroad
enforcement, Type I errors, and a resulting restriction of incentives to engage in
research. Not all legal questions are so easy, however. We move now to consider the
more taxing problem of compelling access to legitimate intellectual property rights.
2. Where the Beneficiaries Do Not Stand in a Horizontal or Vertical Relationship
with the Rights Holder
The paradigm for compulsory interoperability is where the intellectual property
rights at issue are "weak." We employ this concept as a term of art and do not define it
through its colloquial meaning. We do not refer to intellectual property rights that were
improvidently granted and thus vulnerable to invalidation through litigation or
reexamination. Nor do we refer to "weak" patents or copyrights that lack significant
pecuniary value to their holder. Instead, we deem an intellectual property right "weak"
or "strong" on a market-specific basis depending on the right's financial worth to the
holder in each market. It is, accordingly, a context-specific term. Thus, a patent or
copyright might be exceptionally valuable in one market and therefore strong in that
context, but of little or no value in a market where its holder has no intention of
marketing it, and so "weak" for the latter purpose.
Weak intellectual property rights are candidates for socially desirable compulsory
licensing. The reader will note that the term has been defined in such a way that
granting third-party companies access to the copyrighted or patented information
would not appear to result in diminished profits for the holder. Companies standing in
a horizontal or vertical relationship with a dominant intellectual property holder should
never be allowed to demand access to the holder's patent- or copyright-protected
information. Requiring a company to license its technology to a rival in the same
market (a horizontal relationship) in which its intellectual property proves valuable
180. See, e.g., id. at 1069 ("[Tbo hold, as we do not, that private antitrust suits might also
reach monopolies practiced under patents that for one reason or another may turn out to be
voidable under one or more of the numerous technicalities attending the issuance of a patent,
might well chill the disclosure of inventions through the obtaining of a patent because of fear of
the vexations or punitive consequences of treble-damage suits. Hence, this private antitrust
remedy should not be deemed available to reach [Sherman Act] § 2 monopolies carried on under
a nonfraudulently procured patent." (quoting Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 179-80)).
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necessarily diminishes the ex post return from obtaining the protection and thus
reduces ex ante incentives to invest in the innovative process. Such a diminution in ex
ante incentives is socially harmful for the many reasons discussed in Part III.A.
The more interesting case, however, involves mandatory licensing of the same
technology to a company seeking to operate in an unrelated market." 3 Such
compulsory licensing does not appear to reduce ex ante incentives. Indeed, it is
difficult to imagine how a company could complain when it is required to disseminate
its copyrighted or patented information to firms against which it has no intention of
ever competing.
So, for example, if an intellectual property right is a prerequisite for creating a new
and valuable market, which the holder has no plan of entering, a third-party company
seeking to create that market arguably should be able to obtain a mandatory license.
84
As the intellectual property right is "weak" for the purpose of the potential market, it
would seem that compulsory licensing would not adversely affect ex ante incentives.
Indeed, it would appear to enhance them, by giving the patent or copyright holder a
source of income it would otherwise not enjoy. Thus, interoperability would appear to
enhance ex ante incentives if applied in this manner.
Nevertheless, even "weak" patents and copyrights should not be subject to
mandatory interoperability. This argument applies even in cases where a regulator or
court determines that interoperability will either facilitate, or appreciably enhance,
competition in an unrelated market. Accordingly, we reject the position that companies
should enjoy an automatic right to a nonrival's protected code or other technology.
Interoperability is inappropriate even where the technology at issue is a de facto
requirement for the effective emergence of a new market or for the efficiency of an
existing market.
This position may seem draconian to some. At first glance, it would appear
somewhat incongruous to promote consumer welfare, yet deny interoperability that
would ostensibly benefit consumers in cases where those seeking the technology will
not even compete with the intellectual property holder.
The weakness of the argument for interoperability, however, becomes apparent
upon closer examination. In particular, the contention that compulsory licensing will
not reduce ex ante incentives and may even increase them assumes irrationality on the
part of the intellectual property holder. We consider this to be a fatal objection. When
a patent or copyright holder decides not to enter a market in which its technology might
be valuable, it does not decide to forgo that value, but maintains its incentive to capture
that value by eventually licensing on its own terms. Accordingly, a court or authority
should approach with some skepticism a plaintiff's claim that the technology it seeks is
"weak." One would reasonably assume that companies will enter into contracts that
increase their profit. If a patentee or copyright holder declines to license its right to a
third party operating in an unrelated market, by definition it expects to achieve greater
utility by not doing so. Thus, a compulsory licensing remedy will necessarily reduce
the level of expected profit and so reduce the expected gains from engaging in
innovation. Other things being equal, the incentive to devote costly capital to the
183. This refers to a conglomerate market that the holder is not in the process of entering.
184. This assumes that the criteria for Kaldor-Hicks efficiency are satisfied. One component




innovative process will be higher when the inventor knows that its exclusionary rights
will be unqualified.
This point can be expressed in more formal economic terms. Interoperability will
never be Pareto superior because it will necessarily leave the relevant intellectual
property holder worse off. In the separate context considered above, though mandatory
licensing will generate income for the holder that would not have existed absent legal
intervention, the holder is not better off because, if the expected value of licensing
exceeded that inherent in exclusion, the holder would have already adopted the former
course without legal interference.
Importantly, the preceding analysis does not suggest that interoperability is never
desirable when access is sought by nonrivals. Instead, we have seen that
interoperability will not always be desirable in these cases and, as a result, that any rule
allowing mandatory access in all such circumstances would be improper. This Article
argues that the better rule is to preclude any form of mandatory access, even in these
unique circumstances, because of concerns of information asymmetry and Type I error
minimization.
3. Tragedy of the Anticommons
Mandatory interoperability and compulsory licensing could also be socially
desirable in some market failure scenarios caused by a "tragedy of the
anticommons."' 85 This phenomenon can arise where manufacturing or researching a
new product or technology requires the licensing of numerous bits of individually
owned patent- or copyright-protected information. Transaction costs in such situations
can quickly become prohibitive. Such costs flow not just from the number of licensing
arrangements that must be negotiated, but primarily from the fact that each intellectual
property holder has an incentive to extract the full social value expected to be attained
by the prospective innovator as a licensing fee.' 8 6 As each property holder has the
ability to enjoin the innovator's research and development efforts if the latter lacks a
license, each can credibly demand payment far in excess of the marginal value added
by its protected information.' 7 Fortunately, this "hold-out" problem has been
moderated by the recent Supreme Court decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C.,188 which held that a patentee is no longer automatically entitled to an
injunction. 189 Nevertheless, a vast disparity remains between the incremental value of
each licensing negotiation and the relevant license fee. The cost to a prospective
inventor is multiplied by the number of licensors it must bargain with and can quickly
stifle the innovative process altogether. Paradoxically, the frustration of this process
185. For the definitive discussion on the phenomenon, see generally Heller, supra note 25.
Heller defines an anticommons as "a property regime in which multiple owners hold effective
rights of exclusion in a scarce resource." Id. at 668.
186. See generally Douglas Lichtman, Patent Holdouts in the Standard-Setting Process 2
(U. Chi. L. & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 292, 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cftn?abstract-id--902646.
187. See id.
188. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
189. See id. at 391-93.
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makes everyone worse off,190 including the property holders who refused to license at
what would objectively be viewed as a "reasonable" rate.' 91
A tragedy of the anticommons situation can only result where holders of intellectual
property can legally refuse to license their rights. In other words, the hold-out problem
occurs where patent or copyright holders insist on the exclusivity inherent in the rights
awarded them. The question therefore arises as to whether such holders should be
required to license their technologies.
The answer is no. The antitrust laws have no place solving hold-out problems on an
ex post basis by requiring compulsory licensing. In particular, problems of
containment, dilution, and definition are prohibitive. More specifically, if antitrust law
gave rivals ready means to access rivals' blocking technologies, intellectual property
holders would face dire levels of ex ante uncertainty. Moreover, the containment issue
is profoundly worrying-to a significant degree, all valuable patents are "blocking."
They are valuable because they deny rivals the ability to offer reasonably
interchangeable, though noninfringing, products. Granting rivals mandatory access in
circumstances where the blocking problem becomes sufficiently grave leads to
questions of degree and thus promotes uncertainty.
In sum, the problematic stochastic effect of mandatory access arises because of the
ex post nature of the remedy-the far superior path is to use the ex ante legal
mechanisms already in place. Competition enforcers can, and do, encourage "patent
pools,"'192 pursuant to which rivals can agree to cross-license their technologies and so
facilitate the emergence of products that might otherwise not emerge.' 93 The antitrust
laws have grown increasingly receptive to such arrangements and are now quite
facilitative. 194 Such a legal system, conducive to voluntary interfirm contract, bestows
inventors with a level of ex ante security that the prospect of ex post dilution would
not.
190. See Heller, supra note 25, at 625-26.
191. We use "reasonable" in this context to refer to the approximate social value added by
the patented or copyrighted technology to the prospective innovator's efforts and ultimate
product. We explore the difficult question of access pricing more closely in Part IV, infra.
192. See SCOTCHMER, supra note 96, at 179-80; Steven C. Carlson, Note, Patent Pools and
the Antitrust Dilemma, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 359 (1999).
193. For a helpful discussion of the role of patent pools in solving the hold-out dilemma, see
Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-
Setting 17-18 (Competition Pol'y Ctr., Working Paper No. CPCOO-11, 2000), available at
http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1015&context=-iber/cpc. See also
JEANNE CLARK, JOE PICCOLO, BRIAN STANTON & KARIN TYSON, PATENT POOLs: A SOLUTION TO
TrE PROBLEM OF AcCESS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS? 4-8 (2000), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/patentpool.pdf.
194. See generally Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr., Current Antitrust Division Views on Patent
Licensing Practices, 50 ANTrITRUST L.J. 515 (1991) (abandoning application of the "Nine No-




4. Where Exclusionary Conduct Frustrates the Schumpeterian Process of
Competition
Part I explored the unique competitive process underpinning information-market
economics. Seemingly inefficient monopoly structures mask vigorous competition in
standard-setting, technology, and establishment. Long-run consumer welfare benefits
from such vigorous, "winner-takes-all" competition, as it either requires an incumbent
monopolist to continuously match or surpass rivals' technological endeavors or will
result in the displacement of the incumbent by a company offering a superior product.
The interim periods of monopoly pricing, although temporarily displeasing to
consumers, are the necessary impetus to fuel desirable rates of innovation.
Nothing here counsels in favor of interoperability. To the contrary, the innovator
who emerges victorious from a fierce battle for consumer acceptance needs an
unqualified ability to exclude its rivals in order to recoup its ex ante investment and to
earn a profit large enough to compensate for the risk of failure. The economics of
information markets counsel strongly in favor of exclusivity, not interoperability.
Yet, a legitimate role for interoperability may exist as a context-specific remedy to
an unrelated antitrust violation. If the classic offense in traditional market environments
was conduct tending to increase the price at which the relevant market cleared, its
equivalent in the new economy setting is conduct tending to foreclose consumer access
to emerging technologies. The Schumpeterian model of efficient, yet destructive,
competition is founded upon the premise that incumbent monopolies will fall in the
face of rival goods of superior technological quality.1 95 It is this ground, and this alone,
that establishes the normative desirability of temporary monopoly. If it ceases to hold
true, the case for resisting interoperability crumbles.
The antitrust laws can continue to play a valuable role in the new economy setting.
To the extent incumbent monopolists in information markets can perpetuate their
positions through nefarious tactics, competition law can provide a remedy. The optimal
result of antitrust enforcement, of course, is deterrence-the infliction of punitive
measures entails social cost. Yet, if an incumbent has successfully blocked rivals'
channels of access to consumers, interoperable remedies may be normativelyjustified.
This possibility is examined in greater detail below.
196
IV. THE ACCESS-PRICE CONSTRAINT
Part III argued that antitrust enforcers have no normative basis for insisting on
interoperability when those possessing intellectual property opt to enforce the
exclusionary power inherent in the rights granted them. This holds true no matter how
excessive the monopoly profits flowing from such exclusivity may appear. This is so
for many reasons, in particular the prohibitive danger of Type I errors undercutting
investment incentives in information markets and the difficulty of weighing optimal
levels of ex post profit.
Yet, deciding whether a given situation is so exceptional as to warrant
interoperability does not mark the end of the calculus-profound problems remain with
195. See POSNER, supra note 97, at 249-50.
196. See infra Part V.B.
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respect to application. Even if enforcers had reliable means by which to ensure that ex
post rewards would never fall below desirable levels, which would enable them to
demarcate whether and when compulsory licensing would be proper, the formal
decision requiring interoperability precedes the major problem of determining the
terms of access. More specifically, if a dominant intellectual property holder must
make its protected code available to rivals, what price should it charge?
Once more, the issue is easy to describe, but difficult to solve. Indeed, the access
price constraint may be the most problematic hurdle to implementing an otherwise
desirable interoperability remedy.'97 A litany of problems arises: First, and most
fundamentally, is it invariably wrong to leave the pricing decision to the intellectual
property holder? Second, and assuming someone other than the holder should set the
license fee, what is a "reasonable" price? Third, if we can reliably identify such a
price-an unlikely outcome-who should set it and monitor compliance with it? This
Part considers these questions in turn and concludes that no entirely satisfactory answer
exists. The access pricing dilemma is both intractable and socially costly. It therefore
warrants caution on the part of regulators in cases where they would otherwise deem
interoperable remedies desirable.
A. Is It Improper to Let the Patentee or Copyright Holder Set the Price ofAccess?
Not surprisingly, a regulator who demands interoperability will need to regulate the
price of access. If the patent or copyright holder would not license its information
voluntarily, then a rival seeking access needs more than a court order requiring the
holder to make the information available. Absent regulatory intervention, the
intellectual property holder could frustrate the court-ordered license simply by setting
the cost of access above the prospective licensees' reservation price.
Empiricism bears this point out and it is clear that the issue of access pricing is of
primary, not ancillary, importance. Representatively, in the mid-1990s, Xerox
Corporation in the United States settled a large class action lawsuit brought by
independent service organizations (ISOs) that wanted access to Xerox's spare parts.198
The parties settled the case in 1994, but the settlement failed to prevent Xerox from
charging prohibitively large access prices. 99 Thus, ISOs were effectively denied the
judgment they had won.
An even stronger example occurred very recently. On February 27, 2008, the
European Commission fined Microsoft $1.3 billion-the largest fine in the history of
antitrust enforcement-for charging rivals "unreasonable prices" for access to interface
information for work group servers that would facilitate interoperability. 200 The
offending prices were initial royalty rates of 3.87% of licensees' product revenues for
patented information and 2.98% for confidential communication information.20 1
197. See, e.g., Valentine Korah, The Interface Between Intellectual Property andAntitrust:
The European Experience, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 801, 826 (2002) (discussing one facet of the
access price dilemma as applied to the IMS case).
198. See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 964 F. Supp. 1454, 1457-58 (D. Kan.
1997) (discussing the previously settled case involving Xerox Corp.).
199. See id. at 1458.




The question thus arises: how should society get around the license fee dilemma?
Clearly, if interoperability is desirable, the price-setting mechanism cannot be left to
the intellectual property holder. An impartial third party must establish an appropriate
rate of access and then monitor developments to ensure compliance. A foundational
question, however, relates to definition. What exactly is a "reasonable" price for access
to intellectual property?
B. Defining a Reasonable Price in the Compulsory Licensing Context
This brings us to a far more troubling hurdle-what should the access price be? The
tempting conclusion may be to require a "competitive" price. This would be erroneous
on numerous grounds. First, "competitive" in the realm of competition economics is
synonymous with marginal cost.20 2 In the context of information goods, however, the
marginal cost of production approaches zero.2. 3 But, setting access prices at such
negligible levels would prevent the holder from recovering the fixed cost of its
investment, and would lead to its insolvency.2 4
More fundamentally still, an access price set at zero would reward licensees for
losing in the competitive race-they would receive valuable information at a price far
below what would be reflective of the capital and risk required to develop it.
Therefore, price should be set at a supracompetitive level. This is not a controversial
statement in the United States. 205 Unfortunately, the extent to which it holds true in
Europe is questionable.20 6
Yet, "supracompetitive" is, in itself, an inadequate criterion. A more precise
response could be to allow a "monopoly" price. This would make sense, of course, as
this is the price at which an intellectual property holder would freely license its right,
were it inclined to do so.
A monopolist generally maximizes profit by setting price where marginal revenue
equals marginal cost.20 7 However, it is likely impossible for a regulator to accurately
identify this point.208 There will inevitably be a considerable information asymmetry
between a regulator, on the one hand, and a firm actually operating in the market, on
the other. The latter is uniquely well placed to calculate the price that maximizes its
profit. That price depends not only on the internal decision making of the monopolist,
but on the nature of consumer demand. A company will not always know its monopoly
price-it will have to try a range of prices to judge consumer response. As a result of
this experience, the monopolist will be far more attuned to what will likely be a profit-
maximizing price than will an external antitrust authority.209 Finally, the monopoly
202. See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 151, at 62.
203. See SCOTCHMER, supra note 96, at 35.
204. See id.
205. The leading U.S. case on point held that an intellectual property holder's decision to set
supracompetitive prices for patented parts did not constitute patent misuse. See In re Indep.
Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 964 F. Supp. 1479, 1484 (D. Kan. 1997).
206. See, e.g., E899 Million Penalty, supra note 83.
207. See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 151, at 58-62, 89-92.
208. Cf Karen L. Palmer, Diversification by Regulated Monopolies and Incentives for Cost-
Reducing R&D, 81 AM. ECON. REv. 266, 266 (1991).
209. Recognizing this information asymmetry problem, price regulators in regulated network
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price is purely hypothetical in the context of a company ordered to license its
intellectual property against its wishes. Here, the profit-maximizing situation differs
because the holder is being forced to license against its will. This distorts the usual
monopoly price upward. The unregulated monopolist required to license its technology
to a competitor (a requirement that the Authors would never condone 21 ) would
maximize its profit by demanding a license fee so large that it would exceed the
reservation price of the licensees.
Thus, competitive prices are inappropriate and monopoly prices are immeasurable.
What is a regulator to do? The only solution can be somewhere between these elusive
levels-a point that, once again, can only be labeled "reasonable." Ultimately, and in
our view, the "reasonable price" is indeterminate.
Toward which end have enforcers swayed? In Europe, it appears that "reasonable"
access pricing means a level closer to the "competitive" side of the spectrum. More
specifically, the Commission wants price set at a level that does not distort competition
or place licensees at an appreciable cost disadvantage to the licensor. For instance,
Microsoft's practice of licensing its intellectual property-protected code to rivals at a
higher rate than it could avail of itself was held to be "unreasonable," thus subjecting
Microsoft to the biggest fine in the history of antitrust enforcement. 21 1 Under this
practice, rivals of the rights holder are placed at a competitive disadvantage in the form
of higher costs.
Requiring a licensor to make its protected code available at a price that allows the
recipients to compete on equal footing seems both fair and reflective of the reason for
which interoperable remedies were imposed. Yet, requiring a price to be set in such a
way is short sighted. In particular, requiring nondiscriminatory access at such low cost
as to allow "equitable" competition does not adequately compensate the licensor for
the cost and risk of investment in developing the technology. We therefore consider
any such price improper.
In sum, a "reasonable" price can best be described as one that allows the licensee to
receive a supracompetitive return and that does not require an "even playing field"
between the licensee and licensors. 21 2 At the very least, a licensor has earned the right
to a cost advantage.
Of course, this assumes that the antitrust enforcer's decision to require
interoperability is sound. This Article goes to some length to argue that such a decision
will invariably be erroneous. So construed, the optimal access-pricing strategy may
indeed be to leave the pricing decision to the licensor. If the court mistakenly issues an
order requiring the imposition of a compulsory license, the ensuing harm to innovation
would be prevented by allowing the patent or copyright holder to set its own
industries rarely attempt to set a specific price. Instead, they impose incentives to spur efficient
behavior on the part of monopolists, most typically through price-cap regulation. See generally
Ian Alexander & Timothy Irwin, Price Caps, Rate-of-Return Regulation, and the Cost of
Capital, PUB. POL'Y FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR, Sept. 1996, available at
http://rru.worldbank.org/Documents/PublicPolicyJournal/087irwin.pdf.
210. See supra Part II.
211. See C899 Million Penalty, supra note 83.
212. Obviously, then, the recent comments ofNeelie Kroes, the European Commissioner for
Competition, that she ultimately desires a "fair, level playing field" are most worrisome. Charles
Forelle, Europe's Antitrust Chief Defies Critics, and Microsoft, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2008, at
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(prohibitively high) access price. This ground may, in fact, be a strong one in favor of
allowing free price setting.
C. Regulating the Access Price
Assuming, arguendo, that interoperability is appropriate (perhaps as a remedy for an
unrelated antitrust violation for monopolization in an information market-the sole
area in which this Article believes compulsory licensing to be potentially warranted)
and a suitable access price can be established, who should establish and monitor it?
In this regard, it is widely agreed that courts are ill-suited regulators.
213
Accordingly, courts have to appoint a third party to ensure continuing compliance with
the "reasonable" price. Such continuing supervision entails an additional cost.
Illustratively, the European Commission appointed a trustee to monitor Microsoft's
compliance, or lack thereof, with its 2004 Decision.
214
In the end, access pricing does not pose an impossible obstacle to interoperable
remedies when they might otherwise be desirable, but certainly adds a significant cost.
The difficulties in applying the remedy counsel further against its implementation,
which suggests that regulators should respect patent or copyright holders' right to
exclude in close cases. Given that the authors believe close cases will be exceedingly
rare, the optimal rule may simply be to avoid compulsory licensing in all cases except
when remedying unrelated antitrust abuses in network markets.
V. AVOIDING THE ANTrITRUST PARADOX
Myopic regulatory action, particularly in Europe, threatens to transform antitrust
policy into a self-contradictory body of law antithetical to social welfare in the new
economy. Given that information markets are defined by innovation, 215 and that
dominance is ephemeral if innovative efforts from fringe rivals are not matched,216
antitrust policies that corrode ex ante incentives undermine market structure and
eviscerate what may be the only form of competition that truly matters.
European case law has already fallen prey to this novel antitrust paradox. We briefly
consider how such mistaken jurisprudence can be avoided in the future and clarify the
remaining role for antitrust enforcement in the new economy setting.
A. Avoiding the Twenty-First Century Antitrust Paradox
While intellectual property laws are concerned exclusively with dynamic efficiency,
antitrust has been traditionally conceived as protecting allocative, or static, efficiency.
Considerations of productive efficiency have been, and continue to be, ancillary in
213. See, e.g., Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act:
Conscious Parallelism and Refusal to Deal, 75 HARv. L. REv. 655, 669 (1962).
214. See Press Release, European Comm'n, Microsoft Antitrust Case: EU Commission
Appoints Trustee to Advise on Compliance with 2004 Decision (Oct. 5, 2005), available at
http://www.eurunion.org/News/press/2005/2005083.htm.
215. See PAGE& LOPATKA, supra note 32, at 31-57.
216. See POSNER, supra note 97, at 248-50.
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most jurisdictions and assessment of dynamic efficiencies is, at best, incipient in
antitrust analysis.217
Yet, this incipiency would do well to mature quickly. The institutional matrix-
conventionally construed--overlooks myriad welfare-enhancing benefits, in particular
the fact that dynamic efficiencies ultimately and unambiguously control both
productive and allocative efficiencies. First, research and innovation reduce production
costs, freeing resources to be invested elsewhere or redirected to consumers through
social mechanisms of wealth distribution such as stock, financial, and labor markets.18
Second, improvements in existing products shift demand curves in ways that may
increase allocative efficiency. Third, and most important, the invention of new
products directly increases consumer welfare.
All these gains are threatened by antitrust enforcement focused on outdated notions
of static efficiency. The twenty-first century paradox can perhaps best be expressed as
the mistaken sacrifice of dynamic efficiencies in information markets in the name of
short-run allocative gains. Ultimately, such action is likely to diminish consumer
welfare in the long run, representing a self-defeating policy, which may be justified by
political reasons, but hardly by sound economic principles. Once more antitrust seems
to be waging a war against its own goals.
How are antitrust enforcers to avoid falling prey to this mistake? The answer is
simple-the exclusivity inherent in intellectual property should be regarded as
sacrosanct. Interoperability is a word that should have no place in an enforcer's
vocabulary, except to the extent required to remedy a grave, and unrelated, antitrust
violation. In short, a patent- or copyright-holder's right to exclude all others from
availing of its valuable information should be inviolable. No matter how inordinate the
wealth transfer from consumers to monopolist, and no matter how devastating the
damage to rivals, there should be no case for intervention. Enforcing such a policy will
not be easy, of course, given sociopolitical demands for interoperability. But the
remedy for consumer discontent lies in the free market.
It is important to stress that we do not advocate a departure from antitrust
enforcement, but rather seek to limit and redirect antitrust intervention to focus on
conduct most likely to produce significant and negative effects on aggregate welfare.
The following section describes antitrust's proper role in the information setting.
B. Redirecting Antitrust Intervention in Information Markets
Traditional antitrust enforcement targets practices likely to lead to heightened
allocative inefficiency, excessive concentration, and exclusionary practices carrying a
dangerous likelihood of successful monopolization.219 However, if monopolization and
pricing above marginal cost may be both inevitable and desirable in information
markets, as we argue in Part II above, what is the continuing or proper role of antitrust
laws in the new economy setting?
217. See Alan Devlin & Bruno Peixoto, Reformulating Antitrust Rules to Safeguard Societal
Wealth, 13 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FiN. 225,269 (2008).
218. See id. at 275-77.
219. See POSNER, supra note 97, at 193-244 (explaining the optimal legal rules that should
be applied to instances of unilateral anticompetitive behavior by dominant firms).
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The answer lies in protecting the only form of competition that truly matters in
network markets-competition in establishment.220 The Schumpeterian process of
continuous and efficient displacement of incumbent monopoly may well be the reality
in new economy setting, 221 but it can only operate in efficacious manner if open
channels exist for developers of competing and potentially superior technologies to
access consumers. Although empirical and theoretical studies have shown that the
"path dependence" phenomenon has only a limited ability to exclude fringe entry by
innovators offering superior standards, 222 such inventors nevertheless do require means
by which to reach consumers. Absent an ability to market a new technology to
consumers, it may be that insufficient externalities in consumption develop, thus
perpetuating the low-quality, incumbent standard. More precisely, in network markets,
consumers place significant weight on their expectation of how many other consumers
will purchase the good in question. 23 The greater the expectation, the greater the
marginal value of purchasing the product and the easier it will be for a fringe firm
marketing it to successfully displace the incumbent. 224 Similarly, developers of
complementary technologies and products will base their development decision on the
expectation of positive consumer reaction to the product. Thus, both direct and indirect
network effects can aid an entrant's ability to displace an incumbent if the new product
can be widely marketed to consumers.
225
In short, the major competitive danger in the new economy setting is the possibility
of an incumbent halting the dynamic process of creative destruction by blocking
channels of consumer access to emerging products and standards. It follows that
antitrust enforcers should be wary of exclusionary tactics aimed at foreclosing means
of access to information markets. However, such business practices must be
approached with a high level of economic sophistication to ensure that arrangements
that ultimately benefit consumers are not erroneously struck down.226 Although a full
discussion of how exclusionary tactics in the new economy should be assessed is
beyond the scope of this Article, we offer a representative discussion of how such
analysis should generally be conducted and the role that interoperability would play
therein.
First, we draw a distinction between compulsory licensing as a solution to what may
be perceived as an intellectual property holder's excessive success, on the one hand,
and interoperability as a highly limited remedy in a case of a larger antitrust violation,
on the other.227 This Article has gone to some pains to emphasize that the former action
is necessarily improper. 2 8
220. See id. at 248-50.
221. Seeid.at249.
222. See PAGE & LOPATKA, supra note 32, at 94; POSNER, supra note 97, at 248, 250;
Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 103, at 224.
223. See PAGE & LOPATKA, supra note 32, at 92-94.
224. See id.
225. See SCOTCHMER, supra note 96, at 289-305.
226. See POSNER, supra note 13, at 325 (noting that exclusive dealing is usually an efficient
practice).
227. See supra Part III.B.4.
228. See supra Parts I-I1.
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How can an antitrust enforcer identify practices that carry a genuine danger of
impeding the Schumpeterian process of competition? The behavior at issue could take
a number of conceivable forms, from narrow instances of tying to exclusionary
contracts. The defining characteristic of an objectionable practice, however, is one that
imposes costs on potential entrants that do not have to be borne by the incumbent.229 In
other words, where incumbents enter into contracts that raise their rivals' cost and
thereby artificially enhance the expense and risk of entry, the antitrust laws should
condemn the behavior. Fortuitously, a single representative case serves as a perfect
example of how such objectionable exclusion should be measured-StandardFashion
Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co. 230 The facts of Standard Fashion apply equally to
information markets because both situations were and are characterized by positive
externalities in consumption (network effects) that potentially allow an incumbent to
foreclose rival access to consumers.
23 1
In Standard Fashion, the defendant was a manufacturer of an extremely popular
line of women's clothing that retailers were unsurprisingly keen to carry.232 However,
the defendant insisted on exclusive contracts that prevented retailers offering rival
brands.233 This had the effect of foreclosing rival manufacturers of the prime means of
accessing consumers. Of course, the retailers could have vertically integrated to
perform distribution and retail services in-house, thus ostensibly bypassing the
preclusive effect of the exclusive contracts. Thus, it was not the case that they were
denied access to consumers. However, and this is the critical point, the retail market
was characterized by direct network effects-as the range of clothing offered in a retail
store increased, the value to consumers elevated in tandem.234 By being unable by
virtue of the exclusive contracts to offer as eclectic a selection of products-in
particular the highly desirable lines offered by the defendant-the rivals faced the
choice of offering a less attractive selection or expending vast resources on building
and offering a full product line.235 Crucially, the latter course would involve a cost not
faced by the defendant, thus meeting the definition of an objectionable exclusionary
practice.236
The Standard Fashion case is directly applicable to the information setting by
virtue of the network effects there at issue. The modern example of a case that may
have involved analogous reasoning was the U.S. (but not European) action against
Microsoft, in which the company was charged with foreclosing a rival's potential path
of access to consumers. 237 More specifically, Microsoft bundled its Internet Explorer
software with its monopoly operating system and entered into agreements with original
229. See GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 117-21 (1968); cf. JOE S.
BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETrmON 6-7 (1956).
230. 258 U.S. 346 (1922).
231. See POSNER, supra note 13, at 325.
232. Standard Fashion, 258 U.S. at 351-53.
233. See id.
234. See POSNER, supra note 13, at 326 (noting that "[c]onsumers didn't want to traipse from
store to store. They wanted a full line in each store").
235. See id. at 325-26.
236. See id.
237. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999).
2009] 1199
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
equipment manufacturers to prevent deletion of the software.23 s Importantly, the theory
of harm was not based on economically discredited notions of monopoly leverage,
pursuant to which Microsoft would have been seeking "double profits" by
monopolizing browsing software. In contrast, the theory of anticompetitive harm was
based on Microsoft's attempt to prevent Sun Microsystems' Java gaining ubiquity in
conjunction with Netscape Navigator. 239 Netscape had agreed to include Sun's Java
runtime environment with every copy of Navigator.240 Microsoft feared that, were
Navigator to gain enough market share, sufficient application programming interfaces




In short, the browser software market provided a potential route for rivals to enter
the market for operating systems. By foreclosing that means of access, Microsoft could
potentially have prevented or delayed the emergence of superior technology through
the Schumpeterian process of creative destruction. In theory, this is certainly plausible.
Whether the theory was correctly applied to the particular facts in Microsoft is a
different story and one that we do not address in this Article.
242
The important point is that the basic theory of competitive exclusion underlying the
U.S. Microsoft cases is solid and consistent with the concerns articulated in Standard
Fashion. We argue that antitrust intervention in information markets be redirected
exclusively in this manner and away from any concern for interoperability as an end in
itself.
Crucially, the D.C. Circuit went to some length to emphasize that Microsoft did
"not violate the antitrust laws simply by developing a product that is incompatible with
those of its rivals. 243 The court correctly recognized the difference between
interoperability as a remedy to an antitrust violation and exclusivity as an antitrust
offense in itself. Europe would do well to do likewise.
CONCLUSION: DOMINANCE THAT MATTERS
The question of whether intellectual property rights should be sacrosanct or
potentially subject to mandatory access constitutes a challenge of the most profound
importance for contemporary policy makers. The foundation of the entire new
economy lies on the security of such rights, yet the exclusivity inherent in their
employment carries considerable and explicit harm to consumers and allocative
efficiency. Maximizing welfare in a single-shot state of the world may be readily
achievable by requiring interoperability, but such myopic competition policy may
cause extraordinary harm to markets, and hence social welfare. Identifying the precise
238. See id. at 49.
239. See id. at 43-44.
240. See id. at 30.
241. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
242. Compare Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, The Strategic Use of Tying to
Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries, 33 RAND J. ECON. 194, 209-212
(2002) (applying study to United States v. Microsoft antitrust case) with PAGE & LOPATKA,
supra note 32, at 156-57 (opining that the facts of Carlton and Waldman's study did not
actually apply to the Microsoft case).
243. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 75.
1200 [Vol. 84:1157
SUCCESS, DOMINANCE, AND INTEROPERABILITY
point at which the interplay between the low prices sought by antitrust and the
ephemeral exclusivity awarded by the patent and copyright laws maximizes welfare is
likely an impossible task. Nevertheless, this challenge is one that should be addressed
ex ante by the legislature, rather than ex post by courts or regulators.
Recognizing the Sisyphean nature of this task, we argue that antitrust has no place
second guessing the legislature in an ex post context by finding that the exclusivity
inherent in the intellectual property right awarded is excessive and thus granting
competitors access to the protected information. We reach this conclusion on heuristic
grounds--society is better off suffering excessive monopoly prices and ensuring high
levels of continuing innovation, than it is by threatening the future of new economy
markets by myopically insisting on lower prices.
This principle holds true even in those limited circumstances where interoperability
or compulsory licensing remedies appear compelling. Courts should respect intellectual
property rights, even where companies seek access to "weak" copyrights or patents-
that is, information that its holder does not intend to profitably employ in the market
where the technology is sought- or where a "tragedy of the anticommons" threatens to
frustrate the emergence of new products or technologies. Interoperable remedies
should be considered only to remedy an unrelated antitrust violation on the ground of
monopolization in high-technology network markets where the Schumpeterian process
of competition appears threatened. Outside this limited context, interoperability should
be the prerogative of the intellectual property holder.
We are potentially amenable to highly context-specific departures from this position
where there is strong economic ground for doing so and where the socio-political
environment is such that judges and regulators can be trusted to confine narrow
exceptions to their limited holdings. We are skeptical, however, that such an
environment currently exists. There is no question of this being the case in Europe, as
the recent Microsoft decision makes clear. Indeed, Neelie Kroes-the current EC
Commissioner of Competition-recently spoke of the Commission's desire for "a fair,
level playing field.",244 As equitable and desirable as this may appear, it is in fact a
euphemistic mask for an antitrust policy that will likely undermine the well-being of
the very entities that policy was designed to protect. European competition doctrine in
the new economy paradigmatically bears witness to the twenty-first century's antitrust
paradox.
244. Forelle, supra note 212.
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